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PRIVATE CIVIL REMEDIES: 
A VIABLE TOOL FOR 
GUEST WORKER EMPOWERMENT 
Jennifer J. Lee* 
          Despite the well-known abuses of guest workers, the government 
has failed to curb them. Guest workers with H-2A and H-2B visas face 
appalling job conditions, including the confiscation of documents, wage 
and hour abuses, on-the-job injuries without treatment, unhealthy 
housing conditions, and verbal and physical abuse. Although multiple 
government agencies have failed to address the exploitation of guest 
workers, the government has authorized these workers to invoke private 
civil remedies. These remedies can become a means by which 
disadvantaged immigrant workers seek redress for their egregious 
exploitation, particularly given how severely disadvantaged such 
workers are in the political arena. 
          This Article examines to what end the devolution of rights via 
private civil remedies can be leveraged to benefit immigrant workers, 
giving them the opportunity to tell their own story while seeking justice 
for themselves and other workers. Ultimately, this Article argues that 
private civil remedies can play a modest role in vindicating the rights of 
guest workers while simultaneously producing counternarratives that 
combat cultural assumptions about guest workers, ultimately leading to 
guest worker empowerment. 
  
 
 * Managing Attorney, Migrant Farm Worker Division, Colorado Legal Services (CLS). I 
am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Deborah Weissman, Ragini Shah, and Linda 
Surbaugh. I would also like to thank the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for its excellent 
editorial assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not purport 
to represent the views of CLS. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On a sprawling ranch encompassing parts of Colorado, 
Wyoming, and Utah, a group of Chilean cattle herders worked for a 
prominent ranching family after being brought to the United States 
on H-2A visas.1 While on the ranch, their employers held their 
documents and prevented them from personally accessing their 
earnings in the bank.2 They worked seven days per week, up to 
sixteen hours per day, and earned approximately two to three dollars 
per hour, often performing work in violation of their visas.3 One 
worker, who was thrown and kicked by a horse, not only had to wait 
seven days to be taken to a hospital, but was also forced to work 
through his head and chest injuries.4 After he filed a claim for 
worker’s compensation, his boss subsequently interrogated him on 
videotape in order to get him to rescind his claim.5 When two other 
workers asked to leave, the boss denied them their money, passports, 
and documents and threatened them with deportation.6 Several of the 
workers ultimately escaped from the ranch, including two brothers 
who came across a hunter and used his cell phone to call for help.7 
After the workers’ conditions came to light, federal law 
enforcement declined to prosecute the employer because the workers 
were not physically restrained,8 even though the recently enacted 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) 
provided grounds for prosecuting employers that obtain forced labor 
through nonphysical coercion.9 The U.S. Department of Labor 
 
 1. Brandon Johnson, Chilean Workers File Lawsuit, Say Dickinson Family Exploited Them, 
CRAIG DAILY PRESS (June 5, 2006), http://www.craigdailypress.com/news/2006/jun/05/chilean 
_workers_file. 
 2. Deborah Frazier, Attorney: Guest-Work System Can Be Abused, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS (June 3, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2006/Jun/03/attorney 
-guest-work-system-can-be-abused/. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. VERITÉ, IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN US AGRICULTURE: THE ROLE OF LABOR BROKERS IN 
VULNERABILITY TO FORCED LABOR 96–97 (2010). 
 6. Frazier, supra note 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Telephone Interview with Kimi Jackson, Attorney, ProBAR (Jan. 3, 2012). 
 9. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1466–68 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000) (stating that the procurement of human 
  
34 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:31 
 
(DOL) similarly failed to find any substantial violations of law,10 
although the employer had failed to recognize the most basic 
employment rights, such as the worker’s ability to control his 
earnings, seek medical care, or work in an environment free of 
retaliation.11 Each year, employers bring over two hundred thousand 
guest workers12 on H-2A and H-2B visas to work in the United 
States in temporary nonprofessional jobs.13 Despite the well-known 
and documented abuses within the guest worker program,14 the 
government has, for the most part, failed to curb such abuses.15 This 
 
labor through threats, deceitful schemes, or abuses of the legal system is punishable by 
imprisonment or fines); H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (“Because provisions 
within section 1589 only require a showing of a threat of ‘serious harm,’ or of a scheme, plan, or 
pattern intended to cause a person to believe that such harm would occur, federal prosecutors will 
not have to demonstrate physical harm or threats of force against victims.”). 
 10. Letter from Cynthia Watson, Disclosure Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to author (Dec. 1, 
2011) (on file with author). 
 11. The H-2A regulations in effect provided that workers (1) should receive their pay; (2) 
should be covered by workers’ compensation insurance; and (3) should not be retaliated against 
for having raised their rights under the H-2A regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.102(b)(2), (9), (10), 
655.103(g) (1988). As provided, the H-2A regulations neither explicitly prohibited a worker from 
receiving his pay in a bank account nor required an employer to assist a worker in seeking 
medical care. 
 12. “Guest worker” refers to an immigrant worker who is present on temporary 
nonimmigrant visas, such as an “unskilled” worker who receives an H-2A or H-2B visa. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i) (2006). The term has been criticized because it is considered a “euphemism 
for the status and condition of workers.” Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights of H-2A 
Farmworkers, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 521, 522 (2002). This Article will use the term 
guest worker to refer exclusively to workers with H-2A or H-2B visas. 
 13. RANDALL MONGER & MEGAN MATHEWS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NONIMMIGRANT 
ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2010 5 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary 
/assets/statistics/publications/ni_fr_2010.pdf. 
 14. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, NO WAY TO TREAT A GUEST: WHY THE H-2A AGRICULTURAL 
VISA PROGRAM FAILS U.S. AND FOREIGN WORKERS 30–31 (2011); S. POVERTY LAW CTR., 
CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 16–17 (2007). 
 15. While the government touts new efforts to combat workplace violations against guest 
workers, government policies continue to play a substantial role in sanctioning the exploitation of 
guest workers. Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: 
Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 938–39 (2007). The federal 
government recently overhauled the regulations for both the H-2A and H-2B programs. 
Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 
10038 (Feb. 21, 2012) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655); Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-
2A Aliens in the United States, 75 Fed. Reg. 6884 (Feb. 12, 2010) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655). 
At the time of writing, the revised H-2B regulations never went into effect because they were 
enjoined by Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Hilda Solis, No. 12-cv-183-MCR/CJK, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69297 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2012) (order granting preliminary injunction). The 
new regulations address some of the problems within these programs; however, they fail to 
correct the underlying flaw of the program, which provides a temporary visa that is tied to a 
specific employer. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
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failure to protect guest workers reflects the government’s more 
general ambivalence toward workplace exploitation of immigrant 
workers,16 which is symbolic of the general neglect of the working 
class,17 the powerful economic interests of the businesses that rely on 
such exploitation,18 and the political weakness of immigrants who 
 
1446, 1455 (2008) (citing the lack of portability or a path to legalized status as being crucial to 
address guest worker exploitation). See infra Part I for further discussion. 
 16. Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the 
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1726 (2010) (discussing the “national ambivalence about immigration 
outside the law” where unauthorized migrants are permitted to assert their rights indirectly or 
obliquely within the legal system). The U.S. Department of Labor, for example, has recently 
launched a “We Can Help” campaign to inform workers of their rights and encourage them, 
regardless of their immigration status, to report violations of wage and hour laws on the job. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Labor Secretary Sends Message to America’s Under-Paid and 
Under-Protected: ‘We Can Help!’ (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd 
/WHD20100411.htm. On the other hand, the federal government is still conducting workplace 
raids that further drive workers underground and contribute to worker exploitation. Bill Ong 
Hing, One Hand Clapping for Latest Obama Deportation Reforms, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 23, 2011, 6:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/one-hand-clapping-for 
-lat_b_932646.html; see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting 
Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1615 
(2010) (arguing that antitrafficking efforts have been heavily constrained by the policies of rigid 
immigration enforcement); Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through 
Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 
132 (2002) (highlighting the tension between governmental laws relating to immigration 
enforcement and civil rights). 
 17. Annette Bernhardt et al., An Introduction to the “Gloves-off Economy,” in THE GLOVES-
OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 
1, 16–18 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) (describing how the decline in government 
enforcement from 1975 to present has negatively impacted low-wage workers); Karl E. Klare, 
Toward New Strategies for Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 259 (1995) (“[T]he 
United States has chosen a legal regime that not only tolerates but in some ways actively 
encourages low-wage work and the persistence of extreme poverty.”); Frank W. Munger, Social 
Citizen as “Guest Worker”: A Comment on Identities of Immigrants and the Working Poor, 49 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 665, 672–73 (2004) (noting how policies that have reduced regulation and 
downsized the welfare state have resulted in the convergence between immigrants and the 
indigenous working poor in their exclusion from social citizenship); Rebecca Smith, Human 
Rights at Home: Human Rights as an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker 
Communities, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 285, 28889 (2007) (discussing how core standards to 
address the lack of bargaining power of low-wage workers have been neglected). 
 18. Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the 
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 75657 
(2003); Beth Lyon, When More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering U.S. 
Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 594 (2004); 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 567, 590 (2008); Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 16, at 145. 
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are essentially excluded from meaningful membership to our 
society.19 
At the same time that the government has failed to avail itself of 
affirmative investigative initiatives at its disposal, it has authorized 
private civil remedies that can be invoked by immigrant workers. 
The federal government’s failure to protect workers, and its creation 
of these private civil remedies, presents an implicit devolution of 
rights from the federal government to individual workers.20 The 
TVPA created not only immigration remedies for victims of a severe 
form of human trafficking but also a private right of action for 
violations of peonage, slavery, and human trafficking crimes.21 The 
Violence Against Women Act of 2000 created U visas for crime 
victims,22 which advocates are increasingly using to address 
 
 19. Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: Guestworkers, International Trade, and the 
Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 4345 (2006) (noting that immigrant guest 
workers have limited ability to influence legislation relating to the workplaces that are heavily 
regulated by the government); Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants 
in the Administrative State, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 4344 (2008) (describing how immigrants lack 
a full voice in the political system that administers their rights); Munger, supra note 17, at 
67475 (arguing that both immigrants and the working poor are disenfranchised by the political 
process); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 40002 (2006) (describing that the immigration laws presume 
nonmembership of immigrants who are otherwise subject to a sliding scale of rights within the 
United States). 
 20. The perceived failure of the federal government to adequately address immigration 
issues, for example, has led to the devolution of federal immigration powers to the state and local 
governments. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1674 (2011) (“The states, displeased with decades 
of lax enforcement at the federal level, have taken immigration matters into their own hands.”); 
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
787, 80506 (2008) (noting that local lawmakers “have expressed frustration with enforcement 
failures at the national level and thus see a need to take their own action”); Rodriguez, supra note 
18, at 59091 (arguing that the inability to achieve a comprehensive national policy is reflected in 
the diverse local laws that have arisen to address unauthorized immigration). 
 21. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2005); Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003); Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). 
 22. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005–
Technical Corrections, Pub. L. No. 109-271, 120 Stat. 750 (2006) (incorporating technical 
corrections to the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005); Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006); Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464, 153337 (2000). The Violence Against Women Act of 2000 is Division B of the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. 
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workplace crimes.23 The private right of action under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can be used 
against employers for criminal exploitation in the workplace.24 
Organizers around the country are using local, state, and federal laws 
to address wage theft.25 Increasingly, immigrant workers are using 
antidiscrimination laws to characterize their employer’s criminal 
conduct against them as a form of racial or national origin 
discrimination.26 Notably, a governmental impetus to combat crime 
is behind many of these opportunities for private civil remedies. 
Many commentators have noted the failure of the government to 
address the exploitation of immigrants27 and have correspondingly 
advocated for a reformulation of governmental practices and 
 
 23. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, THE U VISA: HOW CAN IT PROTECT IMMIGRANT 
WORKERS? (Aug. 03, 2012), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2012/UvisaFlyer 
EnglishSpanish.pdf?nocdn=1; Memorandum from Naomi C. Earp, Chair, U.S. Equal Emp’t 
Opportunity Comm’n, to Dist. Dirs. and Reg’l Attorneys (July 3, 2008), available at http:// 
iwp.legalmomentum.org/immigration/u-visa/government-memoranda-and-factsheets/U%20VISA 
_EEOC%20Certification%20Memo_7.3.08.pdf; Memorandum from Nancy J. Leppink, Acting 
Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Reg’l Admins. and Dist. Dirs. (Apr. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/fab2011_1.pdf. 
 24. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Title IX of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). 
 25. NIK THEODORE, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., THE MOVEMENT TO END WAGE THEFT: A 
REPORT TO THE DISCOUNT FOUNDATION 10–12, 16–17 (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.discountfoundation.org/sites/all/files/Wage_Theft_Report_2011_Oct.pdf. 
 26. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1866 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (1982)). 
 27. Commentators, for example, have criticized the failure of the federal government to act 
as a watchdog over immigrant workers generally, see, for example, Rebecca Smith & Catherine 
Ruckelshaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: Abating Sweatshop Conditions for All Low-Wage 
Workers as a Centerpiece of Immigration Reform, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 559–
64 (2007), and more specifically with respect to guest workers, see, for example, Andrew J. 
Elmore, Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a Non-Subordination 
Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Nonprofessional Foreign Nationals, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 521, 553 (2007); Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits 
Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing Their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 
598–604 (2001). Others have criticized the government’s failure to prosecute cases against 
employers for the criminal exploitation of workers. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and 
Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2977, 3032–33 (2006); Grace Chang & Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to 
Human Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
317, 324–25 (2007). 
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policies,28 which includes ameliorating the political condition of 
immigrant workers.29 This Article takes a distinct approach by 
examining whether private civil remedies, initiated by the individual 
worker, can provide a viable alternative for immigrant workers 
facing exploitation. Given the availability of such remedies, it is 
worth analyzing whether there may be positive attributes found in 
this devolution of rights.30 Private civil remedies can serve as a more 
immediate tool to address the inherently flawed system that 
engenders workplace exploitation of immigrant workers.31 Because 
immigrant workers are severely disadvantaged in the political arena, 
the use of private civil remedies becomes a means by which to 
address their social and economic rights.32 
 
 28. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 27, at 3040; Elmore, supra note 27, at 562–65; Holley, 
supra note 27, at 616–17; Smith & Ruckleshaus, supra note 27, at 582–600. 
 29. Elmore, supra note 27, at 562. Some scholars have generally explored prescriptive 
solutions to improve the political condition of immigrant workers. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, 
Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 565 (2007) (proposing transnational 
labor citizenship that correspondingly crosses borders); D. Carolina Nunez, Fractured 
Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and Remedies for the Undocumented 
Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817, 870 (2010) (arguing that immigrant workers are members of the 
employment sphere entitled to the full distribution of membership rights available in that sphere); 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants 
and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 278 (2007) (proposing 
substantially expanded opportunities for permanent membership of immigrants by expanding the 
number of LPR visas available to unskilled immigrants). 
 30. This concept is derived from the literature that has examined the positives arising from 
the devolution of federal immigration powers to local governments. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra 
note 18, at 617; Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 57, 59 (2007); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
1619, 1623–24 (2008). 
 31. See, e.g., Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model 
for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247 (2009) 
(demonstrating that trafficked workers can act as private attorney generals to enforce civil rights 
violations against their unscrupulous employers); Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing 
Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891 (2008) (arguing that 
immigrant workers can use U visas as a rights-conferring device for victims of labor exploitation 
and as a tool for collective workplace change); see also Beth Lyon, Tipping the Balance: Why 
Courts Should Look to International and Foreign Law on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker 
Rights, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 169, 230–31 (2007) (arguing that immigrant workers should utilize 
remedies that apply international human right norms). 
 32. Some legal scholarship has forcefully expressed skepticism about the use of the law, 
much less legal remedies, to create meaningful social change. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
85 YALE L.J. 470, 513 (1976); see also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical 
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 451–53 (2001) (providing a brief 
review of progressive legal scholarship and its skepticism toward law as a vehicle for social 
change). The use of the judicial system still remains, however, an accessible, if not important, 
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By using the lens of the guest worker program, this Article 
examines to what end the devolution of rights via private civil 
remedies can be leveraged to benefit immigrant workers. With the 
rather dismal picture of government inaction, it is not surprising that 
advocates have been particularly motivated to consider the use of 
private civil remedies to address the recurring dilemmas within the 
guest worker system. Guest workers, like the H-2A cattle herders, 
have used such remedies to seek redress for their criminal 
exploitation.33 Private civil remedies create worker agency because 
workers can vindicate their rights without having to rely on 
governmental institutions that have historically failed to enforce 
workplace violations of the law. These remedies also give workers 
the opportunity to counter the characterization of being passive 
victims who otherwise can only be assisted “by the largesse of the 
benign state.”34 Even when private civil remedies provide for mixed 
results, workers still participate in reshaping the boundaries of the 
law and produce counternarratives that can confer legitimacy on a 
movement’s claims.35 By placing the employer’s conduct into the 
broader context of criminal exploitation of all workers, these 
 
avenue for the politically powerless to bring about justice. Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at 
Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1617, 1621 (2011) (finding that 
the underlying conditions point in favor of a litigation-based approach for day laborers in Los 
Angeles, not only because these day laborers are politically weak, but also because they possess a 
strong legal right to solicit work in public that, if protected, is self-enforcing); Keith 
Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
1361, 1405 (2009) (“[I]n some instances, the so called ‘individual rights’ afforded by wage and 
antidiscrimination statutes can be more effective vehicles for achieving collective ends than 
traditional labor law currently allows”); Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The 
Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
125, 160 (2009) (“The promotion of private attorneys general and the protection of collective 
action are central to workplace law regulation”); see generally Deborah M. Weissman, Law as 
Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 750 (2002) (“In 
a larger sense, the judicial system is the primary setting to challenge social conditions that bear 
oppressively on those without means.”). 
 33. Johnson, supra note 1; see also infra notes 195–199 and accompanying text (providing a 
further discussion of this lawsuit). 
 34. Leti Volpp, Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and Law, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 507, 509 (2002). 
 35. Cummings, supra note 32, at 1622–23. 
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remedies can help reframe the debate and counter negative cultural 
assumptions about immigrant workers.36 
To begin this analysis, Part I gives a brief background on the 
inherent nature of exploitation within guest worker programs and the 
failure of the federal government to act as a watchdog over this 
exploitation in both the civil and criminal arenas. 
Part II explores how the lack of government action has led to the 
devolving use of private civil remedies to redress guest worker 
exploitation by focusing on three specific examples. In particular, it 
examines how the private right of action under the TVPA and RICO, 
as well as the use of antidiscrimination laws, are particularly well 
suited to address the egregious abuses that arise out of a flawed guest 
worker system. This Part also considers how the use of such 
remedies has advanced the conceptual framework of these laws to 
encompass multiple forms of exploitation. 
Part III examines how this devolution of rights can lead to guest 
worker empowerment, but it also reviews the fundamental 
constraints associated with asserting these rights in a judicial forum. 
Private civil remedies bestow workers with agency and can be 
extended to immigrant workers who work without authorization. 
Immigrant workers, however, legitimately fear reporting workplace 
exploitation, so the use of such remedies must necessarily be 
integrated with other measures, such as outreach and educational 
efforts, crime-related victim visas, litigation tools to protect client 
identity and immigration status, and the support of community-based 
organizations. A delicate balance is also required so that private civil 
remedies do not operate contrary to collective efforts for social 
change. Rather, by producing important counternarratives that can 
ultimately influence the public debate, they should be used in concert 
with organizing, education, and policy reform. Taken with these 
constraints, then, Part III concludes that private civil remedies are 
worth considering as a significant strategy for advancing guest 
worker rights. 
 
 36. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 32, at 1402 (arguing that enforcement of wage and 
antidiscrimination rights “constitutes collective action that ensures better working conditions for 
immigrants and citizens alike”). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Guest workers can come to the United States to work for a 
temporary period of time, usually less than one year, with an H-2A 
or H-2B visa. H-2A visas are for agricultural jobs,37 while H-2B 
visas are for nonagricultural jobs,38 such as those in the landscaping, 
forestry, hospitality, and seafood industries.39 Under these visa 
programs, employers may bring foreign workers from abroad for a 
temporary time period, if the employers are able to prove that no 
U.S. workers are available for the job.40 As part of this process, 
employers are required to submit labor-certification applications to 
the DOL, certifying that they have recruited U.S. workers for the 
specified job positions.41 Only after receiving an approved DOL 
labor certification may employers then apply for the visas with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and actually bring workers 
to the United States.42 
A.  Guest Worker Programs 
Facilitate Labor Abuses 
As one worker advocate has astutely observed, “guest workers 
are not free and have no rights of membership in society.”43 Guest 
 
 37. 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(c) (2012) (defining H-2A program for workers in agricultural labor 
or services). 
 38. 20 C.F.R. § 655.6(a) (2012) (defining the H-2B program for workers in occupations 
other than agriculture or nursing). 
 39. See Jayesh M. Rathod, A Season of Change: Reforming the H-2B Guest Worker 
Program, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May–Jun. 2011, at 20 (explaining how nonagricultural jobs are 
supported by thousands of temporary guest workers with H-2B visas); Arthur N. Read, Learning 
from the Past: Designing Effective Worker Protections for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 
16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 423, 432 (2007) (giving an overview of the H-2B temporary 
non-agricultural worker program); Smith & Ruckelshaus, supra note 27, at 577 (same). 
 40. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.135, 655.40 (2012). 
 41. Id. §§ 655.150–.162, 655.15. 
 42. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)–(6) (2012). 
 43. Hall, supra note 12, at 527. The guest worker programs have spawned a great deal of 
criticism because guest workers are extremely vulnerable to abuse. See generally Bryce W. 
Ashby, Note, Indentured Guests—How the H-2A and H-2B Temporary Guest Worker Programs 
Create the Conditions for Indentured Servitude and Why Upfront Reimbursement for Guest 
Workers’ Transportation, Visa, and Recruitment Costs Is the Solution, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 893, 
895 (2008) (comparing guest worker conditions to indentured servitude); Elmore, supra note 27, 
at 521 (noting that there has been sharp disagreement about whether it is wise to expand labor-
based admissions); Victoria Gavito, The Pursuit of Justice Is Without Borders: Binational 
Strategies for Defending Migrants’ Rights, HUM. RTS. BRIEF Spring 2007, at 5, 5 (2007) (noting 
immigrants’ fear “factors as a barrier to justice”); Griffith, supra note 32, at 126 (noting that 
  
42 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:31 
 
worker programs tie a worker’s temporary visa to a single 
employer,44 so that the employer maintains total control over the 
worker. The employer “dictates the terms and conditions of the 
contract, terminates the guest worker at will, and determines whether 
to extend the work relationship.”45 Further, since H-2 visas are 
temporary and do not provide a path to lawful permanent residency, 
guest workers are a de facto underclass of immigrant workers who 
lack the benefits that come with integrating into U.S. society.46 
The inherent imbalance of power that exists between guest 
workers and employers keeps workers silent in the face of abusive 
 
immigrant workers are currently the subject of debate and that new studies depict how low-wage 
migrant workers suffer severe mistreatment); Lisa Guerra, Note, Modern-Day Servitude: A Look 
at the H-2A Program’s Purposes, Regulations, and Realities, 29 VT. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004) 
(comparing H-2A abuses to those suffered by slaves in the early 1600s); Sovereign Hager, Note, 
Farm Workers and Forced Labor: Why Including Agricultural Guest Workers in the Migrant and 
Seasonal Worker Protection Act Prevents Human Trafficking, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 
173, 173 (2010) (arguing that the H-2A guest worker programs make farm workers especially 
vulnerable to human trafficking); Dorothy E. Hill, Guest Worker Programs Are No Fix for Our 
Broken Immigration System: Evidence from the Northern Mariana Islands, 41 N.M. L. REV. 131, 
152–55 (2011) (blaming H-2 workers’ failure to vindicate their rights on government oversight 
and lack of accessible avenues for worker complaints); Holley, supra note 27, at 577 (proposing 
that H-2A workers are desirable to employers because they are especially vulnerable); Elizabeth 
Johnston, Note, The United States Guest Worker Program: The Need for Reform, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1121, 1121 (2010) (describing abuse of workers); Maria L. Ontiveros, Noncitizen 
Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment: Challenging Guest Worker Programs, 38 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 923, 923 (2007) (labeling immigration as a current “hot-button issue”); Rodriguez, 
supra note 29, at 219 (claiming that the presence of unauthorized immigrants has generated a 
charged debate over the need to overhaul immigration laws). 
 44. Hall, supra note 12, at 529; Rathod, supra note 39, at 22. 
 45. Elmore, supra note 27, at 535. The special subset of H-2A workers who herd sheep, 
goats, or cattle, for example, are entirely dependent on their employer for food, water, and 
communication with the outside world. Jennifer J. Lee, The Sheepherder Project: Devising 
Systemic Change for Marginalized Workers, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. Mar.–Apr. 2012; see also 
Training and Employment Guidance Letter No. 32-10: Special Procedures: Labor Certification 
Process for Employers Engaged in Sheepherding and Goatherding Occupations Under the H-2A 
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 47256 (Aug. 4, 2011) (providing special procedures for employers hiring 
H-2A workers to herd sheep and goats); Advisory from Jane Oates, Assistant Secretary, Emp’t & 
Training Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, to Chi. Nat’l Processing Ctr. Program Dir. State 
Workforce Agency Admins. (June 14, 2011) (regarding special procedures for employers “who 
apply to the Department of Labor . . . to obtain labor certification to hire temporary agricultural 
foreign workers in occupations involved in the open range production of livestock in the United 
States”). 
 46. Ontiveros, supra note 43, at 938 (stating that guest worker visas limit the ability of 
workers to participate fully in U.S. society); Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 222 (finding that guest 
worker programs impose bureaucratic requirements that constrain immigrant mobility in the 
economy and therefore in society at large). The isolation of these workers erects additional 
barriers that prevent them from addressing abuses. Elmore, supra note 27, at 552; Holley, supra 
note 27, at 594–95. 
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working conditions. Guest workers fear retaliation by employers, 
which can include deportation, blacklisting, and denial of rehiring for 
the following season.47 This climate of fear can be created by the 
employers’ explicit threats to call DHS, the existence of a blacklist, 
or even the mere fact that the employer holds the “deportation 
card.”48 The North Carolina Growers’ Association, for example, 
maintained a blacklist of H-2A workers who were barred from rehire 
for the following season because they had complained about job 
conditions, such as the inability to access drinking water in the 
fields.49 
Guest workers may also fear voicing complaints if they arrive in 
the United States with significant debt. Unscrupulous recruiters can 
charge workers for travel, visa, and recruitment costs.50 In one case, 
H-2A workers from Thailand were charged tens of thousands of 
dollars and required to take out risky loans and mortgage family 
farmland to pay recruitment costs.51 Despite labor abuses, arriving in 
the United States in debt motivates workers to remain on the job 
because quitting is not a viable option.52 
As a result, employers can exploit guest workers more readily 
than native low-wage workers. Reported abuses include the 
confiscation of documents, wage and hour violations, neglect of on-
the-job injuries, unsafe and unhealthy housing conditions, verbal and 
physical abuse, and sexual violence.53 Guest workers with significant 
recruitment debt become susceptible to debt bondage and forced 
 
 47. Elmore, supra note 27, at 542; Holley, supra note 27, at 596–97; Read, supra note 39, at 
430–31. 
 48. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 15; Hall, supra note 12, at 533. 
 49. David Bacon, Be Our Guests, NATION, Sept. 27, 2004, at 23. 
 50. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 9–14; Gavito, supra note 43, at 5; Holley, 
supra note 27, at 596. The recently revised H-2A regulations, which prohibit such charges, still 
permit this practice to flourish as employers can simply turn a blind eye. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, 
supra note 14, at 22. 
 51. John Bowe, Bound for America, MOTHER JONES, May–June 2010, at 61, 65. 
 52. Griffith, supra note 32, at 137; Holley, supra note 27, at 596. 
 53. See, e.g., AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW & CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL 
MIGRANTE, INC., PICKED APART: THE HIDDEN STRUGGLES OF MIGRANT WORKER WOMEN IN 
THE MARYLAND CRAB INDUSTRY 2–3 (2010); COLO. LEGAL SERVS., OVERWORKED AND 
UNDERPAID: H-2A HERDERS IN COLORADO 12–19 (2010); FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 
14, at 22–33, 35; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 2; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, CLOSED CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES ILLUSTRATE INSTANCES OF H-2B WORKERS 
BEING TARGETS OF FRAUD AND ABUSE (2010). 
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labor.54 Abuses, such as the confiscation of documents, intimidation, 
and threats, can be connected to human trafficking.55 As long as the 
underlying structural flaw of guest worker programs remains intact—
having workers tied to a single employer by a temporary visa—
workers will lack free choice and the abuses will continue.56 
B.  Government Enforcement 
Is Inadequate 
Multiple government agencies could play a role in addressing 
the exploitation of guest workers. The reality, however, is that 
government oversight has largely failed to provide protection for 
guest workers. 
The DOL oversees the regulatory scheme designed to ensure 
that the employment of H-2 workers does not adversely affect the 
compensation and working conditions of U.S. workers.57 The Wage 
and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL is authorized to enforce the 
terms and conditions of H-2 workers’ employment to ensure 
compliance with the regulations.58 The Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA) of the DOL oversees employer participation in 
the H-2 program by approving labor certifications for employers that 
can show that they comply with the program requirements.59 
The DOL regulatory framework that purportedly protects guest 
workers has remained largely theoretical and has failed to address 
workplace abuses.60 The Obama Administration recently revamped 
the regulations applicable to guest worker programs.61 The 
 
 54. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 23; Elmore, supra note 27, at 536–38. 
 55. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 22–23; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, 
at 38–39; Britta S. Loftus, Coordinating U.S. Law on Immigration and Human Trafficking: 
Lifting the Lamp to Victims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 178 (2011). 
 56. Elmore, supra note 27, at 561; Wishnie, supra note 15, at 1455. 
 57. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.100–.185, 655.1–.81 (2012). 
 58. 29 C.F.R. § 501.0–.9, (2011); 20 C.F.R. § 655.2(a). 
 59. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.130–.135, 655.2(b) (2012). 
 60. Elmore, supra note 27, at 545–46 (referring to guest worker rights as “illusory”); Garcia, 
supra note 19, at 51 (recognizing that abuses continue to exist despite the existence of strong 
worker protections on paper); Rathod, supra note 39, at 22 (discussing how H-2B regulatory 
changes fail to remedy the “core structural flaw” of portability of visas); Read, supra note 39, at 
429 (referring to H-2A rights as “theoretical”). 
 61. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Such regulations may be subject to change 
depending on the politics of the incoming administration. In 2008, for example, the Bush 
Administration enacted regulations for the H-2A program that greatly disfavored workers. 
Temporary Agricultural Employment of H–2A Aliens in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 77110 
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regulations outline specific standards, such as those related to pay 
and deductions,62 as well as more general requirements, such as the 
requirement that employers to “comply with all applicable Federal, 
State and local laws and regulations, including health and safety 
laws.”63 While certain aspects of the revised regulations provide for 
higher standards for workers,64 the regulatory framework, especially 
with its more generalized requirements, still fails to give any specific 
hook for addressing the most egregious conduct of employers, such 
as intimidation, denial of medical care, and verbal and physical 
abuse.65 Further, the regulations say “absolutely nothing about when 
or in what manner the agency must act.”66 Nor is there any 
affirmative requirement in the code that requires regular 
investigations or audits by WHD.67 The regulations also fail to 
contemplate the practical reality that governmental offices are 
 
(Dec. 18, 2008); Modernizing the Labor Certification Process and Enforcement, 73 Fed. Reg. 
77110 (Dec. 18, 2008) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655). In 2008, the Obama Administration 
suspended those regulations. Temporary Employment of H–2A Aliens in the United States, 74 
Fed. Reg. 11408 (proposed Mar. 17, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655). Subsequently, a 
large group of growers sued the Obama Administration for having violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act, and a federal court granted a preliminary injunction. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Solis, 644 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667–68 (M.D.N.C. 2009). Growers have engaged in a campaign “to 
eliminate or weaken job protections, government oversight, and enforcement mechanisms under 
the H-2A program.” FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 37; see, e.g., HARVEST Act, S. 
1384, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 62. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.122(j)–(m), (p), 655.20(a)–(c) (2012). 
 63. Id. § 655.135(e); accord id. § 655.20(z) (“[T]he employer must comply with all 
applicable Federal, State and local employment-related laws and regulations, including health and 
safety laws.”). 
 64. The proposed H-2B regulations raise the standards to make them more analogous to the 
H-2A program. Rathod, supra note 39, at 23–25. 
 65. The regulations contain no explicit protections from this kind of behavior, except for the 
extremely limited provision that prohibits retaliation after a worker has “exercised or asserted” 
any right or protection afforded by the H-2A regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.135(h)(5), 
655.20(n)(5); see also FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 15–16 (reviewing how the 
theoretical worker protections in the revised H-2A regulations do not apply to protect workers in 
practice); Lee, supra note 45 (discussing how the H-2A regulations do not address common 
abuses such as verbal abuse or lack of breaks). 
 66. Holley, supra note 27, at 601 (explaining how the H-2A regulations provide no timeline 
for workers’ complaints in comparison to the strict timelines related to provisions that apply to 
employers). 
 67. It is noteworthy that the H-2B regulations require regular audits by ETA as to the 
certification applications, but not as to actual workplace conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 655.70 (2011). 
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inaccessible to guest workers hoping to use the complaint 
procedure.68 
Apart from these structural inadequacies, WHD largely fails to 
pursue guest worker complaints because of a lack of will and 
resources.69 This is evident in the lack of affirmative oversight and 
irregular inspection of employer worksites.70 In 2004, for example, 
WHD investigated eighty-nine H-2A employers out of the thousands 
that participate in the program.71 When WHD does carry out an 
investigation, it overwhelmingly fails to find meaningful violations 
or redress for workers, or it favors finding violations that can only be 
substantiated on paper.72 A 2009 report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office confirmed what guest workers had 
experienced for years—WHD frequently responded inadequately to 
complaints, leaving workers vulnerable.73 This study found: 
(1) WHD was slow to respond to complaints; (2) cases were 
“resolved” based on unverified information provided by the 
employer; and (3) WHD was reluctant to compel employers to pay 
when violations had been found.74 
When WHD has found substantial violations, ETA has 
subsequently failed to remove employers from the H-2 program. 
ETA has rarely employed its procedures for decertifying or barring 
 
 68. Hill, supra note 43, at 153 (describing how most guest workers do not know where such 
offices are located, and even if guest workers do, that such offices operate only during business 
hours and often have workers who speak only English). 
 69. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 29; Hall, supra note 12, at 531. 
 70. See, e.g., Elmore, supra note 27, at 553; Hill, supra note 43, at 152–53. 
 71. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 29. There is no data on the number of H-2A 
employers that year. In 2007, however, there were an estimated 6,700 employers certified to 
employ H-2A workers. Id. 
 72. See Hill, supra note 43, at 153 (noting that even when WHD does successfully carry out 
an investigation, “the fines and other remedies are generally so little they are ineffective as a 
means of deterring future violations.”). 
 73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-458T, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION’S 
COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS 
VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 1 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130 
/122107.pdf. 
 74. Id. An earlier study found that over time, WHD had reduced the number of 
investigations by 36 percent between 1975 and 2004. ANNETTE BERNHARDT & SIOBHÁN 
MCGRATH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRENDS IN WAGE AND HOUR ENFORCEMENT BY THE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 1975–2004 (2005), available at http://www.brennancenter.org 
/page/-/d/download_file_35553.pdf. 
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employers from either H-2 program.75 In 2009, for example, thirteen 
employers were barred nationally out of the estimated 13,800 
employers that participate in the H-2 program.76 The regulatory 
framework arguably requires the government to meet a high standard 
of proof in order to decertify employers.77 ETA, for example, failed 
to bar an H-2A employer who had allegedly been involved in the 
physical abuse and starvation of its workers.78 Despite the well-
documented abuses within these programs, ETA has thus far failed to 
perform its gatekeeping function to exclude the participation of 
employers that engage in fraud or abuse. 
Even when labor abuses against guest workers rise to a criminal 
level, criminal charges are infrequently brought against the 
employer. Local law enforcement, particularly in the rural 
communities where many of the guest workers reside, has generally 
not been hospitable to guest workers. In one instance, a local sheriff 
pursued a criminal investigation of a legal-services attorney simply 
because she represented H-2A workers who had quit their jobs 
because of abusive conditions.79 Legal-services organizations and 
 
 75. 29 C.F.R. § 501.20 (2011); 20 C.F.R. § 655.72–.73 (2011); Hill, supra note 43, at 
152–53. 
 76. Hill, supra note 43, at 153 (“By way of example, the U.S. DOL website reports that eight 
out of approximately 6,500 H-2A employers in 2009 have been temporarily barred from 
employing H-2A workers, and that five out of approximately 7,300 employers in 2009 have been 
temporarily barred from employing H-2B workers.”); see also David North, Taking Names: List 
of Firms Barred from Foreign Worker Programs Likely Just Scratches the Surface, CTR. FOR 
IMMIGR. STUD. (Apr. 2011), http://cis.org/Debarred-Firms-2011 (“Similarly, in FY 2009 there 
were 7,665 approved applications for H-2A farmworkers, and the Department of Labor’s list of 
debarred participants consists of six names. Again, that is a multi-year list. That ratio is 1 to 
1,278. The H-2B program has about as many approved applications as the H-2A program, and 
perhaps a roughly comparable number of employers. There were 5,998 certified applications in 
FY 2009. The GAO report and ICE press releases have identified 12 violators. That ratio is 1 to 
500.”). 
 77. 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.20, 655.73 (2011). 
 78. Lee, supra note 45; Stuart Steers, Meaner Pastures, WESTWORD, Feb. 1, 2001, at 25. 
 79. Letter from Kimi Jackson, Attorney, Colo. Legal Servs., to Anne B. Filbert, Attorney, 
Filbert & Assocs., P.C. (Mar. 21, 2006) (on file with author); Moffat Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 
Incident Report, Case Report No. 05S00839 (Oct. 31, 2005) (on file with author); Moffat Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, Offense Report 05S00839 (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with author); Moffat Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, Offense Report 06S00380 (May 30, 2006) (on file with author); Moffat Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, Supplemental Offense Report 05S00839.1 (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with author); 
Moffat Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Supplemental Offense Report 05S00839.2 (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file 
with author); Moffat Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Supplemental Offense Report 06S00380.1 (June 9, 
2006) (on file with author); Moffat Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Supplemental Report, Case Report No. 
05S00839.2 (Jan. 30, 2006) (on file with author); Letter from Leslie L. Schluter, Attorney, 
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union organizers have also been charged or threatened with trespass 
by local law enforcement when visiting H-2A workers.80 While local 
law enforcement’s level of cooperation may vary depending on the 
jurisdiction, guest workers have not historically had success with 
local law enforcement addressing abusive conduct by an employer.81 
Despite the advent of federal human-trafficking legislation that 
created new tools for prosecuting debt bondage, forced labor, and the 
unlawful confiscation of documents, there have been relatively few 
federal prosecutions for human-trafficking crimes in the guest 
worker realm.82 Commentators have noted that the prosecutions that 
have occurred often target immigrant employers because criminal 
acts are a “special evil” reserved for criminal aliens.83 In the guest 
worker context, several prosecutions that have received notoriety 
have involved mostly immigrant defendants.84 One recent case 
involved the prosecution of Global Horizons, which brought over 
hundreds of Thai H-2A workers and subjected them to debt bondage 
and forced labor.85 The prosecution centered on the owner of the 
 
Brooks & Schluter LLP, to Deputy Cortland Folks, Moffat Cnty. Sheriff’s Office (Mar. 23, 2006) 
(on file with author). 
 80. LANCE COMPA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM 
OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 
154–55 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2004). 
 81. One notable exception is the New York State Attorney General, who has taken on 
carnival operators with H-2B workers. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney 
Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Secures Hundreds of Thousands in Restitution for Carnival 
Workers Discriminated Against and Cheated Out of Proper Pay (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-secures-hundreds-thousands-
restitution-carnival-workers. 
 82. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which has no criminal 
jurisdiction, has taken on a few high profile cases of human trafficking in the guest worker realm. 
See Part II.C for further discussion. 
 83. Chacón, supra note 27, at 3035–36; see also Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and 
Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U.L. REV. 157, 203 
(2007) (stating that the focus on foreign female victims overlooks the fact that in addition to the 
aliens who are trafficking, U.S. citizens and corporations exploit the trafficked workers). 
 84. See Mark Niesse, Aloun Farms: Charges Dropped Against Sou Brothers in Hawaii 
Human Trafficking Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2011, 5:19 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2011/08/05/aloun-farms-charges-dropped-human-trafficking_n_919261.html; see infra 
notes 85–87. But see United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 373 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Bradley, 390 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 85. Indictment at 3–4, United States v. Orian, No. CR 10-00576, 2010 WL 3440258 (D. 
Haw. Sept. 1, 2010). The charges have since been dismissed by the federal government on the 
basis that the government did not believe that it would be able “to prove the elements of the 
charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, Feds Dismiss Largest U.S. 
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company, Mordechai Orian, an Israeli immigrant, along with his 
employees and several Thai recruiters.86 Another case involved an 
Uzbek organized-crime ring that exploited H-2B workers in hotels 
and other service jobs in fourteen states.87 Meanwhile, mainstream 
corporations that could have been prosecuted for having committed 
crimes against workers are simply held liable for more technical 
violations involving immigration paperwork.88 
The government’s failure to enforce the rule of law with respect 
to guest workers contributes to the overall failure of these programs 
to stem the tide of abuses. This failure stems not only from the lack 
of resources and will but also from the structural inadequacies of the 
regulatory framework. While the government, however, has recently 
committed to increase enforcement of the H-2A program by 
launching a new initiative to tackle labor abuses against farm 
workers,89 at its core, the government still refuses to redesign its 
policies in a meaningful way that would address this exploitation.90 
This continued contradiction in policies reflects a failure to resolve 
the economic reality of needing such workers with a commitment to 
giving them full rights.91 As long as the government maintains this 
ambivalence, guest workers will continue to participate in a system 
that sanctions, if not promotes, abuse and exploitation. 
 
Human Trafficking Case, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/huff-wires/20120720/us-human-trafficking-farm-workers/. 
 86. Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Orian, No. CR 10-00576, 2010 WL 3440258 (D. 
Haw. Sept. 1, 2010); see also Bowe, supra note 51, at 63–64 (illustrating the structure of the 
company). 
 87. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the W. Dist. of Mo., Eight Uzbekistan 
Nationals Among 12 Charged with Racketeering, Human Trafficking, Immigration Violations: $6 
Million Scheme to Employ Illegal Aliens at Hotels, Other Sites in 14 States (May 27, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/mow/news2009/giantlabor.ind.htm. 
 88. Chacón, supra note 27, at 3032–34. 
 89. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Statement by U.S. Secretary of Labor on U.S. 
Farmworkers and Their Families (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa 
/OPA20100850.htm. 
 90. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. H-2A workers are exempt from the major 
federal legislation, the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, which provides 
farm workers with redress for false recruitment, housing, pay, and working conditions. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1802(8)(B)(ii) (2006). H-2B workers are exempt from the requirements such as employer paid 
housing and access to federally funded legal services. Rathod, supra note 39, at 27; Read, supra 
note 39, at 433. 
 91. See Ontiveros, supra note 43, at 938. 
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III.  PRIVATE CIVIL REMEDIES 
In order to address a number of the systemic abuses within the 
guest worker programs, this Article examines the viability of using 
private civil remedies contained within the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization 
Act, and antidiscrimination laws. These laws use a “private attorney 
general” enforcement model by providing for a private right of action 
to reach criminal conduct.92 An examination of these private civil 
remedies suggests that they can be used to reach the more egregious 
forms of employer misconduct that naturally arise from a system that 
gives employers total control over their workers. The use of such 
remedies by guest workers can also contribute to reshaping the law 
by broadening the reach of such private civil remedies to address 
different forms of exploitation. 
A.  Trafficking Victims Protection Act  
Congress enacted the TVPA to combat human trafficking 
through prosecution, prevention, and protection of victims.93 Under 
the TVPA, the government expanded prosecutorial tools to pursue 
traffickers.94 Victims of human trafficking are also eligible for 
protections, such as social services and immigration relief.95 Further, 
the TVPA created a private right of action for victims of human 
trafficking.96 
Much of the criticism pertaining to the TVPA is devoted to the 
narrowness with which the government has implemented the 
mandate of the statute, particularly in viewing who is considered a 
“worthy” victim for purposes of prosecution or issuance of 
benefits.97 In contrast, the private right of action under the TVPA has 
 
 92. They also provide a way for guest workers to assert claims in federal court. Guest 
workers can append their related state-law claims to their federal case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367, especially those that arise from run-of-the-mill contract violations under the regulations. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (detailing the requirements for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction). 
State courts in rural jurisdictions, where workers are usually located, can show bias against 
workers. Holley, supra note 27, at 608–13. 
 93. See supra note 21. 
 94. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–94, 1596 (2006). 
 95. 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(A), (c)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T). 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 
 97. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 27, at 3022–23; Chacón, supra note 16, at 1615; Chang & 
Kim, supra note 27, at 325; Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Human Trafficking: Protecting Human Rights 
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been viewed as one of its fairly positive features.98 Of all the 
remedies created by the TVPA, only the private right of action does 
not depend on government action or approval for its use. Many of the 
cases utilizing the private right of action, in fact, have proceeded 
without any parallel criminal prosecution.99 
Because many of the abuses inherent in the guest worker 
programs, such as recruitment debts, threats of deportation, and the 
confiscation of documents, are characteristic of human trafficking 
crimes, the private right of action under the TVPA is especially well 
suited to address these abuses. The private right of action, codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1595, provides a civil remedy for any violation of the 
criminal laws addressing peonage, slavery, and human trafficking.100 
To date, all reported cases utilizing the private right of action involve 
cases of labor exploitation.101 These cases have broadened the scope 
 
in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 451, 473 (2005); Dina 
Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal and 
Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 350 (2007); Kevin Shawn Hsu, Note, Masters and Servants in America: The 
Ineffectiveness of Current United States Anti-Trafficking Policy in Protecting Victims of 
Trafficking for the Purposes of Domestic Servitude, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 489, 497 
(2007); Loftus, supra note 55, at 185; Ankita Patel, Back to the Drawing Board: Rethinking 
Protections Available to Victims of Trafficking, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 813, 828 (2011); 
April Rieger, Missing the Mark: Why the Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fails to Protect Sex 
Trafficking Victims in the United States, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 231, 246 (2007); Hussein 
Sadruddin et al., Human Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim Protection Beyond 
Prosecution Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 395 (2005); Srikantiah, supra note 83, at 
195; Robert Uy, Blinded by Red Lights: Why Trafficking Discourse Should Shift Away from Sex 
and the “Perfect Victim” Paradigm, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 204, 207–08 (2011). 
 98. Kim, supra note 31, at 250; Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking 
Private Right of Action, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 (2004); Shannon Lack, Note, Civil 
Rights for Trafficked Persons: Recommendations for a More Effective Civil Remedy, 26 J.L. & 
COM. 151, 152 (2008); Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the 
Civil Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (2007). 
 99. Kim, supra note 31, at 293 (stating that out of thirty-one cases brought under the private 
right of action under the TVPA, twenty-three have proceeded in absence of a parallel criminal 
action). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–92. This includes the human trafficking crimes of forced labor, 
trafficking, and unlawful conduct with respect to documents. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–90, 1592. 
 101. At the time of writing, none of the reported cases utilizing the private right of action 
under the TVPA involved claims of sex trafficking. See Theodore R. Sangalis, Comment, Elusive 
Empowerment: Compensating the Sex Trafficked Person Under the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 427 (2011). This is in marked contrast to the federal 
prosecutions under the TVPA, which have favored victims of sex trafficking or victims of labor 
trafficking who were subject to sexual violence. Chang & Kim, supra note 27, at 324–25; 
Srikantiah, supra note 83, at 185. Overall, the number of labor prosecutions has increased over 
recent years. Shelley Cavalieri, The Eyes that Blind Us: The Overlooked Phenomenon of 
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of labor exploitation that is considered to be human trafficking.102 
The 2008 amendments to the TVPA further reinforce this broader 
reading as well as expand the scope of liability under the TVPA.103 
Amendments to the TVPA in 2008 reinforce that physical force 
is unnecessary for the crime of forced labor.104 They codify a broader 
concept of coercion that was discussed in both the original legislative 
history and several early judicial decisions.105 An employer might 
coerce a worker by causing him to believe that if he did not labor he 
would suffer “serious harm,” meaning “any harm, whether physical 
or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational 
harm, that is sufficiently serious.”106 Further, the amendments 
include a consideration of the victim’s particular situation in 
determining whether the harm is sufficiently serious “to compel a 
reasonable person of the same background and in the same 
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services 
in order to avoid incurring that harm.”107 The amendments also 
clarify that threatened abuse of the law is coercive if it was used “for 
any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert 
pressure on another person.”108 
Guest workers can take advantage of this expanded concept of 
nonphysical coercion under the TVPA since most guest worker cases 
do not involve physical abuse of the workers but rather threats of 
 
Trafficking into the Agricultural Sector, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 501, 506–10 (2011). However, they 
still remain low compared to the number of victims of human trafficking certified by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. Id. 
 102. Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 457 (2011). 
Kathleen Kim discusses TVPA case law and the development of what she calls “situational 
coercion,” which “evaluates all the circumstances surrounding the alleged trafficking scenario, 
paying special attention to power inequalities and the workers’ individual characteristics that may 
render them vulnerable to exploitation.” Id. She aptly notes, however, that the TVPA does 
inevitably draw a line pronouncing that only some exploitation is ultimately coerced, while 
arguably, all exploitation is coercive. Id. 
 103. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
147, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c). 
 105. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.); United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 
145, 150–51 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Garcia, No. 02-CR-110S-01, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22088, at *21–22 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003). 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2). 
 107. Id. 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1). 
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deportation as the main coercive element.109 Under the TVPA, 
obtaining labor through threats of deportation can amount to an 
“abuse of law or legal process.”110 Guest workers may face a hurdle 
because threats of deportation can also appear to be advisements of 
legitimate consequences for noncompliance with the terms of an H-2 
job.111 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1), however, guest workers can 
argue that the threat of deportation is being used for a “purpose for 
which the law was not designed” when the objective is to intimidate 
and coerce them.112 In Ramos-Madrigal v. Mendiola Forestry 
Service, LLC,113 H-2B forestry workers were threatened with serious 
immigration consequences and reports to immigration if they were to 
leave the work prior to the end of their contract.114 By examining the 
context of the threat, which included retaining personal documents, 
the court rejected defendants’ argument that threats to report H-2B 
workers to immigration if they left their employment were merely 
informational rather than a “threatened abuse of the legal process” to 
 
 109. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief, Ruiz v. Fernandez, No. 11-cv-
3088-RMP (E.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 2011); Complaint, Samaniego Fernandez v. John Peroulis & 
Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 11-cv-01132-MSK-MJW (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2011); Amended Complaint, 
Razura Jiminez v. Vanderbilt Landscaping LLC, No. 11-cv-00276 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 6, 2011); 
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Ramos-Madrigal v. Mendiola Forestry Servs., LLC, No. 10-cv-
01078-RTD (W.D. Ark. Dec. 10, 2010); Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, Antonio-Morales v. 
Bimbo’s Best Produce, Inc., No. 08-cv-5150-AJM-JCW, 2009 WL 4060936 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 
2009); Complaint–Class Action and Collective Action, David v. Signal Int’l LLC, No. 08-1220, 
2008 WL 1751667 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2008); Amended Complaint, Asanok v. Million Express 
Manpower, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-00048-BO (E.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2007); Complaint, Aguilar v. 
Imperial Nurseries, No. 07CV00193, 2007 WL 1183549 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2007). 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3); accord United States v. Calimlim, 538 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 
2008); Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 
2011); Garcia, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22088, at *22−23. 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2004). In the H-2A 
context, for example, employers mistakenly believe that they have the prerogative to effect a 
guest worker’s removal from the United States. H-2 workers, like any other workers, are free to 
walk off the job. H-2A workers, for example, have a period of thirty days to either depart the 
United States or seek an extension based on a subsequent offer of employment. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(B) (2012). 
 112. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(1); see Ramos v. Hoyle, No. 08-21809, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
102677, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2008); see also Calimlim, 538 F.3d at 713 (examining whether 
the threat was “directed to an end different from those envisioned by the law”). The Supreme 
Court has used such contextual analysis to determine whether reporting an undocumented worker 
was for retaliatory, rather than legitimate purposes. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 
467 U.S. 883, 895 n.6 (1984) (finding evidence that the reporting of undocumented workers 
constitutes retaliation for the workers’ protected activity under the NLRA). 
 113. 799 F. Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Ark. 2011). 
 114. Id. at 960. 
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ensure that the workers did not leave their employment.115 Because 
of the common use of threats of deportation to control guest 
workers,116 an examination of the threats’ contextual circumstances 
is particularly significant to establishing nonphysical coercion.117 
Further, the TVPA’s consideration of the victim’s particular 
situation should be used to give the necessary explanation of how 
coercion operates within the guest worker context. While guest 
workers are not normally subject to physical restraint, other 
individual circumstances may explain why they are not free to leave 
their employment. In Ramos-Madrigal, the court rejected 
defendants’ argument that the H-2B workers were free to return to 
Mexico at any time because it recognized that holding H-2B 
extension documents, in the course of threatening serious 
immigration consequences, was sufficient to “prevent [the workers] 
from leaving employment.”118 The confiscation of guest worker 
passports and visas is not an uncommon practice by employers.119 In 
other cases, courts have confirmed that physical opportunities to 
escape cannot be equated with a lack of coercion under the TVPA if 
the circumstances indicate that the worker is otherwise compelled to 
remain.120 Because a guest worker’s return to his home country may 
facially appear to be an exit option, guest workers need to present 
 
 115. Id.; see also Velasquez Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P’ship, No. 06-cv-01043, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *24 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2007) (finding that defendants’ threat to have 
H-2A workers deported was sufficient to support a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(3)). 
 116. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 16. 
 117. See United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 373 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding the employers’ 
threats of deportation against H-2B workers to be illegal coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 1584 despite 
the fact they were made as a consequence of failing to abide by the employers’ rules). The court 
in Farrell also took into account the “special vulnerabilities” of the workers, which included that 
they were on temporary work visas sponsored by the employers and were entirely dependent on 
them for their housing and transportation. Id. at 374. 
 118. Ramos-Madrigal, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 960. 
 119. COLO. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 53, at 15; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 
15–16; see also Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 75 
Fed. Reg. 6884, 6923 (Feb. 12, 2010) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655) (DOL recognizing “the 
worker’s right not to relinquish possession of his or her passport to the employer”). 
 120. See, e.g., Shukla v. Sharma, No. 07-CV-2972(CBA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90044, at 
*41–42 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009); Ramos v. Hoyle, No. 08-21809, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
102677, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2008). 
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evidence that such a return is not a true option because it would 
result in psychological, financial, or reputational harm.121 
Guest workers should not be deterred from establishing TVPA 
claims even though they may have characteristics that are 
inconsistent with the iconic passive victim of human trafficking.122 
Guest workers willingly seek out visas to work temporarily in the 
United States and have a strong interest in not returning home 
early.123 In a case involving professional guest workers, Nuñag-
Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,124 the court noted 
that plaintiffs, who were able to establish a claim for forced labor, 
“not only wanted, but needed to continue working,” because of the 
massive debts they had accumulated in order to obtain their jobs.125 
A guest worker’s strong desire to continue working and avoid being 
fired should similarly not undermine a claim alleging that the work 
was obtained through coercion.126 The conflation of the desire and 
necessity to work as a guest worker may be tied to any number of 
reasons, such as recruitment debts or the personal humiliation in 
failing to provide for one’s family.127 
Mainstream employers of guest workers often use contractors, 
supervisors, or recruiters to interact with employees, and it may be 
these individuals who commit the egregious abuses against 
workers.128 The TVPA can reach an employer who knowingly 
benefits financially because of “participation in a venture” that the 
employer should have known was engaged in human trafficking.129 
 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2006). See, e.g., Complaint at 8, Espejo Camayo v. John 
Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-cv-00772-MSK-MJW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65494 (D. 
Colo. May 10, 2012) (pleading that being returned home to Peru would create financial and 
reputational harm). 
 122. Srikantiah, supra note 83, at 197–98 (describing that the TVPA favors “a victim 
completely under the trafficker’s control and lacking in free will, unable even to escape until she 
is rescued by law enforcement”). 
 123. Despite being cheated, many guest workers see their employment as the best chance to 
better the lives of their families. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 17; S. POVERTY LAW 
CTR., supra note 14, at 12. 
 124. 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 125. Id. at 1146. 
 126. See United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 375 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that H-2B 
workers established that their employment was involuntary, for at least some portion of their stay, 
even though they had left the country and returned to their employment). 
 127. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 9–14; Bowe, supra note 51, at 65. 
 128. S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 32–33. 
 129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(b), 1595(a) (2006). 
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While an employer still, at a minimum, needs to have reckless 
disregard of the human trafficking acts for liability to attach, a 
mainstream employer cannot as easily distance itself from 
contractors or recruiters who have actively committed human 
trafficking acts against their employees.130 
The use of the private right of action under the TVPA by various 
immigrant workers, including guest workers, has contributed to the 
positive reshaping of the TVPA. By effectively leveraging the 
TVPA, guest workers can target mainstream employers, as the case 
law reveals the broad reach of the TVPA and the broad class of 
individuals it protects.131 In particular, guest workers can leverage 
recent court decisions that emphasize the contextual circumstances of 
the employment relationship, which have ultimately broadened the 
kind of coercion that is actionable under the TVPA.132 Through its 
private right of action, therefore, the TVPA gives guest workers a 
tool to request redress for the criminal acts of their employers. 
B.  Racketeer and Influenced 
Corrupt Organization Act  
Guest workers can also harness civil RICO to hold employers 
accountable even when the government fails to do so.133 RICO was 
enacted in 1970 to combat organized crime by imposing both 
criminal and civil liability to attack the sources of its revenue.134 The 
private right of action under civil RICO can reach criminal activity 
associated with fraudulent recruitment practices, deportation threats, 
 
 130. Despite its broader reach, the new reckless-disregard standard will undoubtedly still 
result in shielding employers from liability through the practice of contracting and 
subcontracting. Chacón, supra note 27, at 3003. 
 131. Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1147 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (stating that “it is the duty of this Court to provide a forum for the alleged victims of 
forced labor, regardless of the severity of the alleged circumstances”). 
 132. Kim, supra note 102, at 458–59. 
 133. The labor movement has disfavored civil RICO because employers have used it against 
unions by employers to undermine union campaigns. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Collateral 
Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 731, 733–35 (2010); Paul More, Protections Against Retaliatory Employer 
Lawsuits After BE&K Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 215 (2004); 
Howard S. Simonoff & Theodore M. Lieverman, The Rico-ization of Federal Labor Law: An 
Argument for Broad Preemption, 8 LAB. LAW. 335, 336–37 (1992). Notwithstanding these 
critiques, this Part argues that civil RICO can be used to the benefit of immigrant workers. 
 134. See generally GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 1–3 (2d ed. 2000) 
(stating the purposes behind the creation of RICO). 
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human trafficking, and fraud related to the H-2A and H-2B visa 
paperwork.135 
There has been scant attention paid to the use of civil RICO 
claims by immigrant workers against employers for abusive labor 
practices.136 In contrast, the use of civil RICO against employers that 
violate immigration laws by hiring undocumented workers is well 
known.137 Such lawsuits gained notoriety as an end-run around 
government enforcement of the unlawful hiring of undocumented 
workers.138 Civil RICO, however, can also operate as an express 
antidote to lax government enforcement of labor abuses to the benefit 
of guest workers.139 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a civil RICO violation can be 
established by showing that there has been an injury caused by a 
pattern of racketeering activity.140 Racketeering activity includes a 
 
 135. See infra notes 142–153 and accompanying text. 
 136. Eleanor G. Carr, Note, Search for a Round Peg: Seeking a Remedy for Recruitment 
Abuses in the U.S. Guest Worker Program, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 399, 417–24 (2010) 
(noting the potential barriers for guest workers to recover foreign recruitment fees with a civil 
RICO claim); Joey Hipolito, Learning from RICO: Immigration Enforcement Through Employer 
Accountability, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 67, 82 (2010) (discussing the failure of the civil 
RICO claims in the Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. case brought by immigrant workers). 
 137. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (allowing employees 
to proceed with a civil RICO claim based on their employer’s illegal hiring of undocumented 
workers that resulted in a reduction of hourly wages); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 
1163, 1169–72 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that employees had standing to sue their employer over 
the hiring of undocumented workers that caused wages to be depressed); Commercial Cleaning 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 378–79 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing a 
competitor to proceed with a civil RICO claim based on the unlawful business profits gained by 
hiring undocumented workers). But see Canyon Cnty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 980 
(9th Cir. 2008) (determining that the county did not have standing to sue companies under civil 
RICO that hired undocumented workers); Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 690–92 (7th Cir. 
2004) (dismissing civil RICO claims brought by employees alleging that the hiring of 
undocumented workers resulted in depressed wages). 
 138. Nancy Cleeland, New Angle in Fight Against Hiring Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 3, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/03/business/fi-ricomo3; Brian Grow, A Body 
Blow to Illegal Labor?, BUS. WK. (Mar. 27, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006 
-03-26/a-body-blow-to-illegal-labor. 
 139. See, e.g., Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1148 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that Filipino immigrant workers “sufficiently stated a claim for RICO 
violations”). 
 140. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). Further, the injury needs to be economic and proximately 
caused by the predicate acts. Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846–48 (11th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff needs to allege not only that 
her injuries were direct, rather than derivative, but also that they were proximately caused by the 
RICO violation. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–70 (1992). Some factors 
to examine as to whether the injury is too remote include:  
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number of crimes that have been statutorily enumerated at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961. A pattern of racketeering activity requires the commission of 
at least two predicate acts over the course of ten years.141 A plaintiff 
must also establish “standing” by properly asserting a “violation of 
section 1962,” which includes defendant’s operation of an 
“enterprise.”142 An “enterprise,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 
can be any legal entity as well as a “group of individuals associated 
in fact although not a legal entity.”143 Courts have recognized an 
“association-in-fact” to include, beyond defendant employers, others 
who facilitated the exploitation, such as recruiters, immigration 
attorneys, or U.S. consular officials.144 
 
(1) the ‘difficult[y]’ in ‘ascertain[ing] the amount of a[n] [indirect] plaintiff's damages 
attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors’; (2) the 
‘complicated rules’ courts would be forced to adopt to ‘apportion[] damages among 
plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the 
risk of multiple recoveries’; and (3) the existence of a ‘directly injured victim[]’ who 
‘can generally be counted on to vindicate the law’ and serve the law’s ‘general interest 
in deterring injurious conduct.’ 
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602, 613 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
269); see also Oregon Laborers-Emp’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 
F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that a “direct relationship between the injury and the 
alleged wrongdoing” is a key element of proving proximate cause in RICO cases). 
 141. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006). The pattern must also have “continuity” and “relatedness” 
meaning that they need to have continued for a sufficiently long period of time and have similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, and/or methods of commission. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. 
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239–43 (1989). 
 142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1962(a). The four distinct ways to violate § 1962 are: (1) 
investment, § 1962(a); (2) acquisition, § 1962(b); (3) participation, § 1962(c); and (4) conspiracy, 
§ 1962(d). A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) requires that a defendant received income derived 
from a pattern of racketeering activity and used or invested such income in the acquisition, 
establishment, or operation of any enterprise. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) requires that a 
defendant acquire or maintain, through a pattern of racketeering activity, any interest or control of 
any enterprise. The use of §§ 1962(a) and 1962(b) is difficult because they require a showing that 
there was an actual injury from the investment of the income or acquisition of the enterprise. 
Injury stemming from the commission of predicate acts alone is insufficient. See, e.g., Abraham 
v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2007) (dismissing claims brought under §§ 1962(a)–(b) 
for failure to show the requisite injuries). A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) requires that the 
defendant, who is employed by or associated with the enterprise, conduct or participate in the 
conduct of such an “enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” While the 
actual injury can stem from the racketeering activity, the defendant must be a distinct entity from 
the enterprise. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). 
 143. An “enterprise” includes both legitimate and illegitimate organizations. United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981). 
 144. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 588 F. Supp. 2d 718, 725–26 (E.D. La. 2008); Velasquez 
Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P’ship, No. 06-cv-01043-WYD-MJW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
567, at *8, *16 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2007). 
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Several common abuses of guest workers can constitute 
racketeering acts that are actionable under civil RICO. An 
employer’s exploitation of guest workers is often premised on false 
promises made to workers at the time of recruitment.145 In Magnifico 
v. Villanueva,146 the court allowed plaintiffs to proceed on their 
claims of fraudulent recruitment under a theory that the fraudulent 
recruitment constituted the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.147 
Plaintiffs were citizens of the Philippines who were recruited to work 
on H-2B visas at various country clubs in Florida and New York.148 
When they arrived, however, they were placed in severely crowded 
housing, worked long hours, and faced exorbitant deductions for 
food, housing, and transportation, despite having been promised that 
these benefits would be free of charge.149 The court accepted that 
plaintiffs had adequately alleged that defendants committed the 
racketeering acts of mail and wire fraud by having made false 
promises or misrepresentations about the terms and conditions of the 
job and by having used the mail and wires to do so.150 
Guest workers may argue that employer abuses amount to the 
commission of the predicate act of visa fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1546. Since guest workers are present on H-2A or H-2B visas, the 
employer may have committed fraud associated with their visa 
applications. The court in Magnifico, for example, held that plaintiffs 
had sufficiently alleged visa fraud by arguing that the employer’s 
applications for H-2B visas contained material misrepresentations 
about the true terms and conditions of the job.151 Further, all H-2A 
 
 145. AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW & CENTRO DE LOS DERECHOS DEL MIGRANTE, INC., 
supra note 53, at 24; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 22–23; see also Hall, supra note 
12, at 531 (discussing how agricultural workers, other than H-2A workers, normally have a 
federal private right of action under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
if the employer “does not accurately disclose the terms and conditions of employment at the time 
of recruitment”). 
 146. 783 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 147. Id. at 1222, 1228. 
 148. Id. at 1221–22, 1228. 
 149. Id. at 1222. 
 150. Id. at 1228; see also David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 588 F. Supp. 2d 718, 721, 726 (E.D. La. 
2008) (declining to dismiss civil RICO claims of mail and wire fraud based on false promises 
made to recruit workers). The use of the mail or wire needs to be for the purposes of executing 
the fraudulent scheme, but need not be an essential element of the scheme. Schmuck v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1989). 
 151. Magnifico, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1222, 1228; see also Velasquez Catalan v. Vermillion 
Ranch Ltd. P’ship, No. 06-cv-01043-WYD-MJW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *18–19 (D. 
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and H-2B applications for labor certification require that employers 
sign under the penalty of perjury that, among other things, the 
employer will comply with all “Federal, State and local employment-
related laws and regulations.”152 Any knowing misrepresentation that 
the employer would comply with such laws is arguably actionable 
under the visa-fraud provision.153 
Employers commonly engage in verbal abuse that can include 
threats to intimidate and control guest workers. Threats to induce 
fear, including threats of deportation, can constitute the predicate act 
of extortion either under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 or via a state-law 
equivalent of extortion law under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).154 In 
Nuñag-Tanedo, the court found that plaintiffs, who were professional 
guest workers, had adequately pleaded the racketeering act of 
extortion because they had sufficiently alleged that defendants’ 
threats of deportation and financial ruin amounted to the “wrongful 
use of fear.”155 In particular, the court focused on the circumstances 
of plaintiffs as immigrant workers who had incurred substantial debts 
to conclude that the “threatened deprivation of income and the ability 
to continue working in the United States was wrongful.”156 
Guest workers can also use civil RICO’s incorporation of the 
TVPA, as well as the older antipeonage laws, to reach employers that 
have committed human trafficking acts, such as forced labor or the 
 
Colo. Jan 4, 2007) (declining to dismiss civil RICO claims based on the predicate act of visa 
fraud). In order to apply for guest worker visas, employers are required to submit a labor 
certification application to the DOL, signed under the penalty of perjury, certifying the job 
description and compliance with all employment-related laws and regulations. See infra note 152. 
 152. Both H-2A and H-2B employers must submit the ETA 9142 labor certification 
application. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ETA FORM 9142 apps. A.2, B.1, available at 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/form.cfm (follow “Appendix A.2” or “Appendix B.1” 
hyperlinks) (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 153. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006) (stating that “[w]hoever knowingly makes under oath, or as 
permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, knowingly 
subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application”). 
 154. Any act of extortion that “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce” violates 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951. Courts have allowed civil RICO claims based on the racketeering act of extortion to 
proceed for guest workers who have been threatened with deportation, punitive measures, or 
imprisonment, albeit with virtually no discussion. See Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 353–54 
(5th Cir. 2007); Velasquez Catalan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *21. 
 155. Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1150–51 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011). Plaintiffs pleaded the racketeering act of extortion by using the state extortion law, 
§§ 518 and 519 of the California Penal Code. Nuñag-Tanedo, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. 
 156. Id. at 1151. 
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unlawful confiscation of documents.157 A civil RICO claim may be 
made based on any racketeering act related to human trafficking 
enumerated at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1592.158 
Plaintiffs can face hurdles in properly pleading a civil RICO 
claim, and the failure to do so can be the death knell for a case.159 
Since many civil RICO claims sound in fraud, a complaint must meet 
the heightened pleading requirements of the “who, what, where and 
when” required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).160 Guest 
workers, however, can take advantage of case law that permits courts 
to relax such heightened pleading standards when knowledge of an 
employer’s operations is peculiarly within the possession of 
defendants.161 
Guest workers have successfully managed to characterize many 
egregious abuses in their employment as predicate acts under civil 
RICO.162 Civil RICO’s private right of action can extend to abusive 
acts that are otherwise not actionable under the existing regulatory 
 
 157. See, e.g., Abraham, 480 F.3d at 354; Magnifico v. Villanueva, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 
1228 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Velazquez Catalan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *21. 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). 
 159. See, e.g., Saucedo v. Five Star Contractors, No. 09-CV-268, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
60108, at *8–9 (S.D. Miss. June 6, 2011) (finding civil RICO claims inadequately pleaded but 
granting leave to attempt to replead); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 
(D.N.J. 2006) (dismissing civil RICO claims after providing leave to replead the claims). 
 160. Civil RICO claims that do not sound in fraud should not have to be pleaded with 
particularity. See Velasquez Catalan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *20–21 (suggesting that 
nonfraud claims do not have to meet 9(b) requirements). The Supreme Court has declined to 
extend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s requirements to nonfraud claims in other contexts. 
See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993) (declining to apply 9(b) to § 1983 claims). 
 161. See, e.g., Velasquez Catalan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 567, at *19–20 (relaxing the 9(b) 
requirement for identifying which defendants were involved in the fraud relating to visa 
applications and payroll based on the group published doctrine exception); Vega v. Contract 
Cleaning Maint., Inc., No. 03-C-9130, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20949, at *39–40 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 18, 2004) (relaxing the 9(b) standard for unskilled janitorial and maintenance employees 
who had no access to information regarding the manner in which each particular defendant 
participated in the alleged fraud). But see Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 
F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to relax the 9(b) requirements for failure to 
plead facts related to the mail and wire fraud claim). 
 162. Notably, some cases have been brought under or in conjunction with state RICO laws. 
See, e.g., Magnifico, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 n.8; Complaint, Acosta v. Beasley, No. 04 CV 
005067 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2004) (alleging the racketeering act of blacklisting of H-2A 
workers who had asserted their rights under their contracts). In North Carolina, for example, a 
criminal law that prohibits the blacklisting of workers can be actionable via the state civil RICO. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-355 (2012). Because state RICO laws often incorporate state criminal laws 
as racketeering acts, they may provide additional avenues to address guest worker exploitation. 
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system or regulated by the government. In doing so, guest workers 
can statutorily seek treble damages to reach the illicit profits made by 
employers from their exploitation.163 Civil RICO claims, therefore, 
give guest workers another tool for redressing an employer’s 
criminal conduct. 
C.  Racial Harassment and 
Hostile Work Environment 
In the guest worker context, discrimination claims have largely 
focused on the unlawful preference exhibited toward guest workers 
over U.S. workers.164 The popular media regularly reports on this 
preference by sympathetically portraying farmers who bemoan the 
difficulties of being forced to employ U.S. workers who have “gotten 
soft.”165 The subtext of this preference for guest workers is well 
known. Because of the inherent vulnerability of guest workers, 
employers are able to “squeeze out maximum productivity at 
minimal labor cost,” while engaging in abusive labor practices.166 
Not surprisingly, employers may engage in such abuses, in part, 
because of their underlying prejudices against guest workers.167 
Being able to prove such discrimination has historically been 
difficult because of the general lack of evidence that non-guest 
workers were being treated more favorably.168 
 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 164. In both the H-2A and H-2B program, it is unlawful to discriminate against U.S. workers. 
20 C.F.R. §§ 655.135(a), 655.20(q) (2012). U.S. workers have also brought claims pursuant to 
Title VII, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. By contrast, there are very few reported cases 
where guest workers have alleged violations of antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Reyes-Gaona v. 
N.C. Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that ADEA claims could not be 
applied extraterritorially for an H-2A worker claiming that he had been denied a job in the United 
States based on his age); Olvera-Morales v. Int’l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 05-CV-00559, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3502, at *34–35 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 2008) (permitting sex discrimination claims to 
proceed against an employer who offered less favorable work to its female H-2B employees). 
 165. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Hiring Locally for Farm Work Is No Cure-All, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2011, at A1; Erik Ortiz, Foreign Workers, Not Laid-Off Locals, Filling Seasonal Jobs, 
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news 
/press/cape_may/article_fc82f8a6-40ba-11df-9697-001cc4c002e0.html; Dan Rather, Help Not 
Wanted?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-rather/help 
-not-wanted_b_761132.html. 
 166. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 17. 
 167. Id. at 27; S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 14, at 34–36. 
 168. Most employers solely employ guest workers. Leticia Saucedo has noted the inherent 
difficulties in disparate impact and/or treatment claims for “brown collar” immigrant workers in 
segregated workplaces because the current proof frameworks hinder successful litigation on these 
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A more readily available remedy for guest workers may be to 
claim racial or national origin harassment based on a hostile work 
environment. Guest workers can bring racial or national origin 
discrimination claims for what amounts to criminal behavior by the 
employer pursuant to Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981.169 Title VII 
prohibits employment discrimination based on an individual’s race or 
national origin.170 Plaintiffs in Title VII cases may also seek relief 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which covers discrimination on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, and sometimes alienage.171 Acts of verbal abuse, 
threats of deportation, or false imprisonment can be used as evidence 
of animus based on race or national origin. Even if these criminal 
acts appear facially neutral, guest workers can use these acts to help 
 
claims. Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making 
of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 982–86 (2006). 
 169. This discussion is limited to the tools of race and national origin discrimination that are 
applicable to all guest workers, although the EEOC has taken on an increasing number of cases 
alleging sex discrimination based on criminal sexual behavior against female immigrant workers. 
See Complaint, EEOC v. La Pianta, LLC, No. 09-cv-00303-RHW (E.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2009) 
(alleging sexual harassment by a supervisor who, among other things, sexually assaulted a female 
farm worker); Complaint, EEOC v. Willamette Tree Wholesale Inc., No. 09-cv-00690-PK (D. Or. 
June 18, 2009) (alleging sexual harassment of female farm workers, which included sexual 
assault); Complaint, EEOC v. Wilcox Farms, Inc., No. 08-cv-01141-MO (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2008) 
(alleging sexual harassment on behalf of a female farm worker who had suffered from physical 
sexual assault); EEOC v. Harris Farms, No. 05-16945, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9127, at *4 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 17, 2008) (affirming a punitive damages award of $800,000 against an employer for sex 
harassment and retaliation by a supervisor). 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 171. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed 
by white citizens.” Id. § 1981(a). Section 1981 has been extended to include persons of immigrant 
ethnic groups, so long as the plaintiffs allege that the discrimination is based on their race or 
ethnicity rather than their national origin. See Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 
F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Although national origin discrimination is not within the ambit of 
§ 1981, race has been defined broadly to cover immigrant ethnic groups.”). Section 1981 claims 
are treated similarly to claims brought under Title VII. See, e.g., Eliserio v. United Steelworkers 
of Am., 398 F.3d 1071, 1076 (8th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., Inc., 361 F.3d 
1021, 1028 (7th Cir. 2004). Section 1981, however, provides for a few advantages over Title VII, 
including a longer statute of limitations, the lack of caps on certain damages, and the ability to 
reach smaller employers. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: 
The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent 
Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 256–57 (1997). Further, it may also reach alienage 
discrimination, although the case law is mixed. Compare Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343, 1351–52 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 492 U.S. 901 (1987), opinion 
reinstated, 887 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that the protections of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 do not extend to prohibit alienage discrimination), with Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 
167, 180 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides a claim against private 
discrimination on the basis of alienage). 
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construct a claim of hostile work environment. Further, guest 
workers can allege a claim of racial or national origin harassment 
independent of the burden associated with the traditional 
comparators necessary to establish a disparate treatment or impact 
claim. 
In the case of a hostile work environment based on race or 
national origin, the legal framework is equivalent to that used for 
cases of sexual harassment.172 An objectionable environment “must 
be both objectively and subjectively offensive.”173 The harassment 
must be based on race or national origin and be sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the terms of conditions of employment and create a 
hostile or abusive environment.174 A few isolated incidents of racial 
enmity are insufficient to find liability175 because the work 
environment must be so “heavily polluted with discrimination as to 
destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the minority 
[employee].”176 
In Chellen v. John Pickle Co.,177 immigrant workers from India 
found themselves living and working under substandard 
conditions.178 Multiple derogatory remarks based on the workers’ 
national origin supported the finding of a hostile work environment 
under Title VII and § 1981.179 More notably, the court used the 
employer’s threats of physical harm and deportation back to India to 
support its harassment finding.180 In particular, the court examined 
how the threats to send the workers back to India were coercive 
because plaintiffs feared the possible harm that awaited themselves 
 
 172. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2012) (EEOC sexual harassment guidelines), with 29 
C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2012) (EEOC harassment guidelines on basis of national origin). See also 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998) (“Courts of Appeals in sexual 
harassment cases have properly drawn on standards developed in cases involving racial 
harassment.”). 
 173. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 
 174. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 175. Snell v. Suffolk Co., 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 176. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Rogers v. 
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 177. 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006). 
 178. Id. at 1263–66. 
 179. Id. at 1265–66. 
 180. Id. 
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and their families upon their return, including the potential for 
financial ruin.181 
As they did in Chellen, guest workers can present acts of 
intimidation, including threats of deportation, as harassment based on 
race and/or national origin. In David v. Signal International, Inc.,182 
H-2B workers from India alleged that their employer maintained a 
hostile and abusive work environment based on race, national origin, 
and alienage through the actions and statements of its personnel in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.183 Besides offensive language and 
insults, workers were subjected to multiple threats of deportation and 
false imprisonment in guarded labor camps.184 In EEOC v. Global 
Horizons, Inc.,185 H-2A workers from Thailand alleged 
discriminatory harassment on the basis of race and national origin.186 
Global Horizons had allegedly engaged in largely criminal behavior 
by regularly intimidating and threatening workers with deportation, 
arrest, and physical violence, and by unlawfully confiscating their 
identification documents.187 
While neither of these cases has resulted in a court decision on 
these claims, the viability of a racial or national origin harassment 
claim based on criminal behavior is promising based on the 
developments in the analogous claim of sexual harassment.188 In sex 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. 588 F. Supp. 2d 718, 721 (E.D. La. 2008).  
 183. Complaint–Class Action and Collective Action, David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, 588 F. Supp. 
2d 718 (E.D. La. 2008) (No. 08-1220); see also Complaint, EEOC v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. 
1:11CV179-LG-RHW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7615 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 24, 2012) (filing racial 
harassment claims against the company under Title VII). 
 184. See David, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 722. 
 185. No. 11-00257, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127734, at *47 (D. Haw. Nov. 2, 2011). 
 186. Complaint, EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., No. 11-cv-03045-EFS, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 105993 (E.D. Wash. July 27, 2012); see also First Amended Complaint, U.S. EEOC v. 
Global Horizons, Inc. at 9, No. 11-cv-00257-DAE-RLP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127734 (D. Haw. 
Nov. 2, 2011) (“Global [Horizons]—often with the help of the agricultural companies and farms 
with which it contracted—subjected the Claimants to different terms and conditions of 
employment and engaged in a pattern or practice of such acts based on the Claimants’ Thai 
national origin and Asian race.”). 
 187. Complaint, supra note 186. The case in the District of Hawaii was recently dismissed 
without prejudice against the growers that contracted with Global Horizons. EEOC v. Global 
Horizons, No. 11-00257, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127734, at *47 (D. Haw. Nov. 2, 2011). The 
court stated that the EEOC had failed to sufficiently plead how the growers were involved in the 
racial discrimination alleged against Global Horizons. Id. at *35–36. 
 188. One earlier case involving guest workers settled after the filing of the complaint. 
Consent Decree, EEOC v. Trans Bay Steel Corp., No. 06-cv-07766 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8. 2008). 
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discrimination cases, courts consider the “totality of the 
circumstances” in evaluating whether the harms are sufficiently 
severe and pervasive to create a hostile work environment.189 In 
particular, Martha Chamallas has explained that “room has been 
cleared for fact finders to consider the background social identities of 
the actors and power dynamics at the workplace before they decide 
whether actionable harm has occurred.”190 Such contextual analysis 
has allowed courts to find, for example, that verbal abuse and threats 
of physical violence that were not overtly sexual could constitute 
sexual harassment.191 Facially neutral abusive conduct can support a 
finding of discrimination sufficient to sustain a hostile-work-
environment claim when the conduct is viewed in the context of 
other overtly discriminatory conduct.192 Similarly, the confiscation of 
documents, threats of deportation, and false imprisonment can help 
establish a hostile work environment claim if coupled with other 
discriminatory conduct, such as derogatory comments or insults, 
against guest workers.193 
Seemingly neutral acts of intimidation and abuse that are 
endemic to guest worker programs can assist in constructing a claim 
of harassment based on race or national origin. Examining the 
totality of the circumstances provides an opportunity to explain how 
the power dynamics of guest worker programs can lend themselves 
to a hostile work environment. Further, the advantage of pleading 
such neutral acts of intimidation and abuse that appear criminal in 
nature is that they are objectively severe.194 Antidiscrimination laws, 
 
 189. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2011). 
 190. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to 
Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2175 (2007). 
 191. See, e.g., Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 2005); Carter v. Chrysler 
Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir. 1999); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138–39 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 192. Chavez, 397 F.3d at 835–36. 
 193. An employer who is not directly involved in the harassment can still be held liable for a 
hostile work environment created by its supervisors under the theories of vicarious liability or 
because of negligence. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1997); Davis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
 194. Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, The Words that Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight 
Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY. L. REV. 33, 57 (2009) (noting that racial-harassment cases 
alleging threats of physical harm were more likely to survive summary judgment). 
  
Fall 2012] GUEST WORKER EMPOWERMENT 67 
 
therefore, can give guest workers another vehicle to address their 
employers’ exploitative acts. 
IV.  EMPOWERMENT OF 
GUEST WORKERS 
Private civil remedies can serve to empower guest workers. The 
H-2A cattle herders discussed in the Introduction of this Article 
brought their own civil action utilizing private rights of action under 
the TVPA and civil RICO.195 They were able to allege, for example, 
that their employer used threats of deportation as coercion to subject 
them to forced labor under the TVPA.196 Under civil RICO, plaintiffs 
claimed that defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of visa 
fraud by requiring them to perform work that was unauthorized by 
their visas.197 Further, plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ use of 
threats and intimidation, including an attempt to get one worker to 
rescind his workers’ compensation claim, amounted to the wrongful 
use of fear under the civil RICO predicate act of extortion.198 In 
making such claims, these workers were able to control their own 
case and did not have to rely on the governmental agencies that 
ultimately failed them. Rather, they were able to achieve a resolution 
on their own terms, which, in addition to monetary damages, 
provided injunctive-type relief requiring the employer to implement 
new policies monitored for a period of two years.199 
The use of private civil remedies, therefore, can create worker 
agency by vindicating individual rights and enforcing workplace 
norms. Guest workers need not rely on government agencies that 
shift enforcement priorities with each change in administration and 
also lack the resources or will to enforce the laws.200 Nor need they 
 
 195. Velasquez Catalan v. Vermillion Ranch Ltd. P’ship, No. 06-cv-01043, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 567 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2007). 
 196. Id. at *24. 
 197. Id. at *18–20. 
 198. Id. at *24. 
 199. Settlement and General Release Agreement at iii, Velasquez Catalan, No. 06-cv-01043 
(D. Colo. May 28, 2008) (on file with author). The terms of the agreement required the employer, 
for example, to develop an employee handbook in Spanish, permit workers to occasionally take 
trips off the ranch, and facilitate the purchase of cell phones. Id. at iii–iv. 
 200. Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 16, at 135 (explaining that the private right of action 
under the civil-rights laws was to address the concern that “the State will be less likely to exercise 
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rely on a feckless regulatory system that fails to reach the more 
egregious abuses by employers. Rather, they can, on their own 
initiative, use private civil remedies to address employer exploitation 
and request compensatory damages, punitive damages, or injunctive 
relief.201 In the process, they can contribute to creating new legal 
precedents that help advance the laws combating workplace 
exploitation.202 The award of damages can provide vindication to 
plaintiffs that they have achieved some form of justice and positively 
impacted the lives of existing workers or future employees.203 
Guest workers potentially have increased access to the use of 
these private civil remedies because they provide for attorneys’ 
fees.204 The availability of attorneys’ fees expands the pool of 
available lawyers beyond the limited resources of the nonprofit 
organizations that have traditionally represented underserved guest 
workers. The additional complexities that arise from litigating a case 
on behalf of guest workers, however, may practically limit the 
willingness of some within the private bar to take on such cases.205 
 
its power on behalf of those who, lacking a majority in a democratic society, have less influence 
on the political process”). 
 201. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 1981a(a)(1). Civil RICO 
provides for treble damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can provide for 
back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-
5(g)(1); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). Title VII has caps on 
compensatory and punitive damages, but 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not. 42 U.S.C 
§§ 1981a(b)(3), 2000e-5(g). The TVPA provides for “damages,” which are not defined. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1595(a). Punitive damages are available under the TVPA. Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 
1098 (9th Cir. 2011). Under a state analog statute, treble damages are awarded. See, e.g., CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 52.5(b) (West 2007). 
 202. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 31, at 293–94 (discussing how the use of the private right of 
action under the TVPA has created important precedents and advanced legal norms). 
 203. In Aguilar v. Imperial Nurseries, for example, twelve guest workers received a default 
judgment of $7.7 million for claims that included human trafficking and civil RICO. No. 3-07-cv-
193 (JCH), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48404, at *4 (D. Conn. May 28, 2008); see also Cunningham-
Parmeter, supra note 32, at 1406 (“The individual enforcement of workplace norms benefits 
several groups of workers, including the plaintiff, her coworkers, and future employees who join 
a workplace reformed (hopefully) by their predecessor’s actions.”); Kim, supra note 31, at 293 
(discussing how the private right of action under the TVPRA provides for more effective 
deterrence); Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 16, at 135 (discussing how civil-rights statutes 
increase the level of compliance with antidiscrimination laws through the use of private 
individuals who act in the place of the State). 
 204. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595(a), 1964(c); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k), 1988(b). 
 205. Cathleen Caron, Portable Justice, Global Workers, and the United States, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 549, 551 (describing how the transnational migration 
of immigrant workers presents hurdles to legal cases); Susan Reed & Ilene J. Jacobs, Serving 
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Nonetheless, the availability of attorneys’ fees increases the ability of 
those without adequate resources to enforce the law,206 and it can 
give increased access to legal representation for guest workers to 
vindicate their rights. 
Through these private civil remedies, guest workers can also 
access the courts to tell their stories. Storytelling can have a cathartic 
effect as well as promote solidarity among workers.207 Further, this 
telling of stories can contribute to the counternarrative about guest 
worker exploitation in the public discourse.208 Cases involving 
private civil remedies have helped to create a counternarrative that 
undermines the dominant assumption that guest worker programs 
provide a convenient solution to both employers with labor shortages 
and immigrant workers seeking jobs.209 In particular, high-profile 
guest worker cases have most likely contributed to policy changes to 
the guest worker programs, but they have not been enough to 
eradicate the programs.210 The increased use of private civil remedies 
 
Farmworkers, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 367, 369 (describing the linguistic and 
cultural challenges in representing farm workers). 
 206. Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 385, 
390–91 (2000) (citing fee shifting as a grounds for opening the adjudication system to all); see 
also Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741 (1986) (finding that “the Fees Act has given the victims 
of civil rights violations a powerful weapon that improves their ability to employ counsel, to 
obtain access to the courts, and thereafter to vindicate their rights by means of settlement or 
trial”). There has recently been a sharp increase in cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) on behalf of low-wage workers. Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts 
Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 727, 735 (2010) (suggesting that the increased number of cases seeking to recover wages 
from employers is due, in part, to the “increased number of plaintiffs’ lawyers successfully 
pressing wage claims”). 
 207. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2437 (1988). 
 208. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice 
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 888 (1997); see also Sameer M. Ashar, 
Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1917 (2007) 
(describing how the strategies of litigation and protest by workers against private actors were for 
the “audience” of city council members and government agency personnel). 
 209. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Suit to Charge that Nursery Mistreated Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 2007, at B2 (describing a trafficking lawsuit on behalf of Guatemalan workers who had 
large recruitment debts and whose passports were confiscated); Steven Greenhouse, Low Pay and 
Broken Promises Greet Guest Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at A1 (describing a 
trafficking lawsuit on behalf of Thai workers who paid exorbitant recruitment fees to a contractor 
for jobs in the United States). 
 210. The recently revised H-2A and H-2B regulations, for example, now explicitly prohibit 
the confiscation of passports and require employers to contractually prohibit any of their agents 
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by guest workers can publicly expose how these programs sanction, 
if not promote, criminal exploitation. The resulting narratives can 
confer legitimacy on the necessary agenda of substantially modifying 
or eradicating guest worker programs that compromise individual 
liberty.211 
While the discussion in this Article has thus far focused on guest 
workers, private civil remedies can be extended to the much larger 
population of immigrant workers who work without authorization 
(“unauthorized migrants”) to vindicate their rights. In John Does I–V 
v. Rodriguez,212 for example, unauthorized migrants sued under both 
the TVPA and civil RICO based on allegations that they worked and 
lived under constant surveillance to pay off smuggling debts.213 The 
workers reached a settlement with some parties and received a 
default judgment of $7.8 million against others.214 In another 
example, Montano-Perez v. Durrett Cheese Sales, Inc.,215 
unauthorized migrants sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for a hostile and 
abusive work environment, alleging that their employer threatened 
not only to withhold their pay but also to call authorities to have 
them arrested and detained.216 The case settled for a court-enforced 
judgment of $75,000.217 While unauthorized migrants can employ 
private civil remedies, it should be recognized that they may not be 
able to access the full range of damages because of Hoffman Plastics 
Compounds v. NLRB.218 In Hoffman Plastics, the Court held that the 
NLRB could not award an undocumented worker with back pay as a 
remedy.219 While the impact of Hoffman Plastics is still developing 
 
from charging recruitment fees. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.135(e), (j)–(k), 655.20(o)–(p), (z) 
(2012). 
 211. Elmore, supra note 27, at 541; Ontiveros, supra note 43, at 928; Wishnie, supra note 15, 
at 1455–56. Mary Lee Hall has noted the irony that undocumented farm workers have noted that 
they had more liberty than H-2A farm workers. Hall, supra note 12, at 536. 
 212. No. 06-cv-00805 (D. Colo. Apr. 13, 2009). 
 213. Complaint, John Does I–V v. Rodriguez, No. 06-cv-00805 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2006). 
 214. John Does I–V, No. 06-cv-00805, slip op. at 2; see also Felisa Cardona & Kevin 
Vaughan, Fields of Fear for Colorado Illegal Farm Laborers, DENVER POST, May 17, 2009, 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_12387869 (reporting on the judgment). 
 215. No. 08-cv-01015 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 16, 2008). 
 216. Complaint, Montana-Perez, No. 08-cv-01015. 
 217. Montano-Perez, No. 3:08-cv-01015, slip op. at 1. 
 218. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 219. Id. at 151–52. The worker had obtained the job by presenting fraudulent documents, and 
the employer had not known that the worker was undocumented at the time of hire. Id. at 141. 
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with respect to the availability of back pay for unauthorized 
workers,220 courts have reaffirmed that certain damages still remain 
available, such as unpaid wages for work performed, compensatory 
damages for pain and suffering, and punitive damages.221 
Unauthorized migrants, therefore, can similarly use such private civil 
remedies to take control of their own claims by seeking damages 
while telling their story of exploitation.222 
By focusing on criminal exploitation by employers, the use of 
private civil remedies has the potential to reframe the debate about 
immigrant workers and broaden the discussion to include the 
exploitation of all low-wage workers. Government policies that have 
criminalized immigration law and subsequently led to the increased 
prosecution of immigrant workers223 have cultivated the public 
perception of immigrant criminality.224 The use of private rights of 
 
 220. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding Hoffman inapplicable to a claim for compensatory damages based on lost earnings in a 
personal-injury case where the employer had knowingly violated immigration laws in hiring the 
worker); Avila-Blum v. Casa De Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citing Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)) (suggesting that Hoffman may not be 
applicable to the collection of back pay for Title VII violations). 
 221. In the FLSA context, courts have explicitly determined that workers are eligible for 
compensatory and punitive damages for unlawful retaliation. See, e.g., Renteria v. Italia Foods, 
Inc., No. 02-C-495, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14698, at *19–20 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003); Singh v. 
Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 222. Ashar, supra note 208, at 1921 (noting that immigrant workers who initiate “litigation 
can, at least partly, compensate for their lack of legal status” since it can assist them with 
otherwise “assert[ing] countervailing power in their workplaces and communities”). 
 223. Much has been written on the criminalization of immigration law. See, e.g., Daniel 
Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th 
“Pale of Law”, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 653–55 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The 
New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and 
Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); Teresa A. Miller, 
Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 611 (2003); Dinesh Shenoy & Salima Oines Khakoo, One Strike and You’re Out! The 
Crumbling Distinction Between the Criminal and the Civil for Immigrants in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 135 (2008); Stumpf, supra note 19, at 367. The increased 
collaboration between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities has chilled the 
ability of immigrant workers to enforce their rights and made them more prone to exploitation. 
Ashar, supra note 208, at 1887–88; Saucedo, supra note 31, at 900. Further, the increased use of 
criminal prosecutions of immigrant workers after “silent raids” has further driven workers 
underground. Ong Hing, supra note 16. 
 224. Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1839–40 (2007) (discussing mental linkages between 
crime and immigration); Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 85–86 (1998) (describing how U.S. policies have criminalized “the 
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action under the TVPA, civil RICO, and antidiscrimination laws can 
shift the focus from the presumption of the criminality of immigrants 
to the actual criminal conduct of the employer in exploiting workers. 
Hiroshi Motumura has noted that courts are more willing to 
recognize the rights of unauthorized migrants when the employer is 
engaged in more serious wrongdoing.225 Further, the criminality of 
employers has advanced immigrant workers’ rights in other arenas 
by broadening the discussion to the exploitation of all low-wage 
workers. The movements to end wage theft have successfully 
emphasized the criminality of employers through direct actions by 
publicly shaming employers and pushing to criminalize the 
nonpayment of wages.226 Laws that punish employers for criminal 
exploitation of all workers can be more politically palatable because 
they appear facially neutral on the inflammatory question of 
immigrants. The passage of laws addressing wage theft has occurred, 
in part, because broad coalitions of low-wage workers have come 
together to push such legislation.227 By comparatively characterizing 
the employer’s wrongdoing as criminal, private civil remedies can 
potentially contribute to reshaping the public’s imagination about 
immigrant workers and can frame worker exploitation within the 
greater context of the government’s failure to protect all low-wage 
workers. 
Any discussion about using private civil remedies as part of a 
broader strategy to vindicate immigrant workers’ rights, however, 
must be balanced against a reality in which workers legitimately fear 
reporting workplace exploitation. It is well known that all immigrant 
workers, whether unauthorized migrants or guest workers, are 
 
immigrant’s actions, status, and dreams”). Recent government actions continue to highlight the 
criminality of immigrants. Jeff Bliss, U.S. Arrests 2,900 Illegal Immigrant Criminals in 
Crackdown, BUS. WK., Sept. 28, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-28/u-s 
-arrests-2-900-illegal-immigrant-criminals-in-crackdown.html; Julia Preston, Resistance Widens 
to Obama Initiative on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A11. 
 225. Motomura, supra note 16, at 1750–51. 
 226. THEODORE, supra note 25, at 12, 16–17. Nik Theodore notes that the term “wage theft” 
did not appear in any major newspapers or print sources until 2005. Id. at 21–22. 
 227. Deborah Axt et al., The Campaign to Pass New York’s Wage Theft Prevention Act, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Jul.–Aug. 2011, at 157 (describing the unanimous support from labor for 
the Wage Theft Prevention Act, S. 8380/A. 11726 (2010) (codified at N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 195–
99, 215–19, 661–63)); THEODORE, supra note 25, at 16 (describing the coalitions that worked on 
the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115. (2010)). 
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reluctant to report exploitation, much less use the judicial system to 
enforce their rights, largely because of fear of retaliation and 
deportation.228 Outreach and education efforts, in collaboration with 
community-based organizations, provide information to workers 
about their rights so that they can make informed choices about their 
options.229 The availability of crime-related victim visas can provide 
some protection that may tip the balance toward convincing certain 
immigrant workers to come forward.230 Further, in a number of cases 
filed by immigrant workers, courts have prohibited discovery into 
immigration status, finding that the prejudicial impact of the 
disclosure of such information was outweighed by its irrelevance to 
the claims of workplace exploitation.231 In cases where workers fear 
retaliation by the employers, such as blacklisting, deportation, and 
 
 228. AFL-CIO, IMMIGRANT WORKERS AT RISK: THE URGENT NEED FOR IMPROVED 
WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICIES AND PROGRAM 7–8 (2005) (describing the 
underreporting of health and safety violations by immigrant workers because of retaliation fears); 
Caron, supra note 205, at 551 (describing the workers’ fear of retaliation and lack of knowledge 
about rights or where to obtain legal assistance); Stumpf & Friedman, supra note 16, at 143–44 
(describing a lack of information, cultural barriers, few resources, and high turnover as hurdles to 
enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 
678–79 (2003). See supra Part II.A for a discussion on the climate of fear among guest workers. 
 229. Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services 
Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433, 449 (1998). 
 230. Chacón, supra note 27, at 3011 (noting the provision of T visas for victims of a severe 
form of human trafficking); Kim, supra note 31, at 307 (discussing the TVPA’s authorization of 
continued presence for trafficked workers); Saucedo, supra note 31, at 939 (noting that the U visa 
can serve the purpose of “protecting workers and empowering them to come forward”); see also 
Garcia v. Audobon Communities Mgmt., LLC, No. 08-cv-01291, slip op. at 7 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 
2008) (granting U visa certifications to undocumented plaintiffs based on their criminal 
exploitation). Further, federally funded legal-services organizations are able to represent 
individuals who qualify for crime victim visas. Letter from Helaine M. Barnett, President, Legal 
Servs. Corp., to LSC Program Dirs., (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://grants.lsc.gov/rin 
/grantee-guidance/program-letters/current-program-letters (Program Letter 06-2); Letter from 
Helaine M. Barnett, President, Legal Servs. Corp., to LSC Program Dirs., (Oct. 6, 2005), 
available at http://grants.lsc.gov/rin/grantee-guidance/program-letters/current-program-letters 
(Program Letter 05-2). 
 231. See, e.g., Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Reyes, 
814 F.2d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1987); EEOC v. First Wireless Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406–07 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, 
Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464–
65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Hernandez v. City Wide Insulation of Madison Co., No. 05C0303, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86756, at *3–4 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 2006) (denying a discovery request 
regarding immigration status to invalidate the credibility of plaintiffs); Cortez v. Medina’s 
Landscaping, No. 00C6320, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) 
(holding that immigration status has no bearing on claims for unpaid wages related to work that 
was performed). 
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violence, workers may be able to initiate a lawsuit anonymously.232 
Worker-organizing and community-based organizations can also 
give significant support to workers who seek legal redress for 
exploitation.233 While none of these tools will manage to completely 
extinguish fears associated with reporting workplace exploitation, 
they can give some modicum of encouragement to immigrant 
workers who consider using private civil remedies against their 
employer. 
Private civil remedies have other constraints. They cannot be the 
mainstay in the political strategy of achieving social reform for guest 
workers. Nor do the particular private remedies discussed, the 
TVPA, civil RICO, and antidiscrimination laws, even presume to 
solve the ills facing immigrant workers, as they only address fairly 
egregious forms of exploitation. Yet these remedies do offer a 
paradigmatic mechanism for exercising individual worker agency, 
assisting collective efforts to enforce workplace norms, and 
contributing to the legal development of remedies to the benefit of all 
workers.234 Counternarratives created from the use of the legal 
system can positively influence policy reform and lend legitimacy to 
the movement of immigrant workers, thereby contributing to overall 
worker empowerment.235 The use of such remedies, therefore, should 
be carefully coordinated with collective worker strategies, such as 
organizing, education, and policy reform, which have proved 
important to the fight against the exploitation of immigrant 
workers.236 On balance, the use of private remedies can be viewed as 
a successful part of the parcel of strategies for advancing guest 
workers’ rights. 
 
 232. Does I–XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068–73 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Javier v. Garcia-Botello, 211 F.R.D. 194, 196 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 233. Ashar, supra note 208, at 1910 (describing “construction of a tripartite relationship 
between lawyers, workers, and organizers”). 
 234.  At times, the enforcement of individual rights can serve as a more effective vehicle for 
achieving collective ends and impacting regulation of the workplace. In North Carolina, a lawsuit 
brought by H-2A workers using private civil remedies resulted in leverage that a farm-worker 
union used to achieve the first collective-bargaining agreement for guest workers in the country. 
Acosta v. Beasley, No. 04 CV 005067 (N.C. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 13, 2004); Interview with Lori 
Johnson, Attorney, Legal Aid of N.C. (Jan. 28, 2013). 
 235. Yamamoto, supra note 208, at 888–89. 
 236. THEODORE, supra note 25, at 12–13, 25 (discussing examples of combined organizing 
and litigation strategies); see also Ashar, supra note 208, at 1910; Cummings & Eagly, supra note 
32, at 491–92. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has illustrated the positive attributes that come with 
the devolution of rights from the federal government to individual 
workers by describing the potential power of private civil remedies 
for guest workers who suffer from workplace exploitation. Without 
private civil remedies, the H-2A cattle herders at the Introduction of 
this Article would have had no recourse and been left to suffer as 
passive victims of an apathetic state. Instead, these workers had the 
opportunity to tell their own story while seeking justice for 
themselves and other workers. As the debate about the broken 
immigration system in the United States continues, lawmakers will 
continue to seek to expand current guest worker programs.237 Based 
on its past record, the government will likely continue to fail to stem 
the tide of the endemic abuses associated with these programs. Guest 
workers, therefore, will continue to need to look toward private civil 
remedies as a means of enforcing their rights and improving 
workplace conditions. To this effect, private civil remedies can play a 
modest role in the movement to realize full labor and employment 
protections for immigrant workers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 237. See, e.g., Adam Van Brimmer, State Ag Commish: Feds Must Act on Guest Worker 
Program, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 360924; Marc 
Heller & Brian Amaral, Visa Program for Workers Is Unworkable, Owens Says, WATERTOWN 
DAILY TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 6216136; George Prentice, Obama: U.S. 
Needs Immigration Reform; Crapo Suggests Guest Worker Program, BOISE WKLY., May 10, 
2011, http://www.boiseweekly.com/CityDesk/archives/2011/05/10/obama-us-needs-immigration 
-reform-crapo-suggests-guest-worker-program. 
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